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EXPERIMENTATION IN SECURITIES MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
REGULATION IN CHINA:  FROM STATE TO MARKET  
Xiao Li and Iain MacNeil 
 
A key feature of the socialist market economy in China is the development of securities 
markets so as to facilitate entrepreneurship. With the national securities market now well 
established attention has shifted to the development of lower tier markets that may be able 
to meet the financing needs of smaller scale enterprises. In this article we examine how the 
concept of experimentation has been applied to the process of developing such markets and 
the regulatory framework in which they operate. We begin with a survey and critique of the 
policy and regulatory framework within which lower-tier markets have evolved. We argue 
that experimentation has been important in China but that it operates in a unique way as a 
result of the institutional structure in which securities markets are located. We then focus 
more specifically on the regulatory framework for lower tier markets and present two case 
studies focused on the establishment and operation of two local equity exchanges in a single 
province (LiaoNing). While this evidence supports our view on the significance of 
experimentation it also highlights the problems associated with developing lower-tier 
securities markets within the current policy framework.     
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One outcome of the recent financial crisis has been the prioritisation of financial stability 
as a regulatory objective by international and national regulators.1 Financial stability can be 
                                                   
 Xiao Li is Assistant Professor of Law at The City University of Hong Kong. Iain MacNeil is the 
Alexander Stone Chair of Commercial Law at the University of Glasgow. We are grateful to City 
University Hong Kong and the Adam Smith Research Foundation at the University of Glasgow for 
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1 While financial stability was omitted in the regulatory objectives of the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) in the UK, it is now one of the legislative objectives for the FCA and PRA. In the US, a 
Financial Stability Oversight Council was introduced in 2010. An international body on financial 
stability, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was established in 2009, as a successor to the Financial 
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defined as the dynamic ability of the financial market to “facilitate and enhance economic 
processes, manage risk, and absorb shocks.”2 To achieve this objective requires a proper 
understanding of risks and uncertainty. In a Knightian world, risk is different from 
uncertainty in that the former is quantifiable and measurable whereas the latter not.3 For 
Minsky, such overlooked uncertainty, which he characterized as the endogenous instability 
problem of the financial market, may contribute to recurrent financial crises.4 This is because 
false confidence in the measurable future among market participants results from projecting 
future trends on the basis of past experience. 5  As uncertainty is unavoidable and 
immeasurable, the simple oversight of the difference between risk and uncertainty may 
invalidate any claim of adequacy and effectiveness of a predetermined regulation. 
 
The issue is then how we deal with a dynamic world of uncertainty. The risks of both 
over- and under- regulation are real. Overregulation may be good for market stability but at a 
cost of inhibiting competition and financial innovations or the creative destruction which is 
indispensable to the development of capitalism. 6  Alternatively, under-regulation may 
contribute to free competition and financial innovation but increase the risk exposure of the 
whole financial system. Both will ultimately impose costs on taxpayers. A balance must be 
reached to achieve financial market stability and the sustainable development of the economy 
as a whole. However, the correct balance is difficult to achieve, especially since social and 
political pressure may drive regulators to adjust the risk tolerance of the entire financial 
system.7 
 
In the light of the priority now given to financial market stability and the fact that 
financial regulations almost always lag behind financial innovations, a sensible regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                              
Stability Forum (FSF). The Board of the FSB includes representatives of the G-20 major economies, 
FSF members and the EU. For more information on the FSB, see 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/> accessed 19 November 2015.  
2 See Garry J. Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (2004), IMF Working Paper WP/04/187.  
3 See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Boston, MA: Houghton Mufflin 1921), 
197–232. 
4 See Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (first published 1986, New York: 
McGraw-Hill 2008) especially at 219–245. 
5 Alessio M. Pacces, ‘Consequences of Uncertainty for Regulation: Law and Economics of the 
Financial Crisis’ (2010) 4 ECFR 479. 
6 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros. 1942). 
7 See Iain MacNeil, ‘The Trajectory of Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial 
Crisis’ (2010) 11 EBOLR 483, discussing the role of so-called “light touch” regulation in the UK.  
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goal is not to search for an optimum end-point for regulation but rather to pursue a new 
governance institution which accommodates never-ending recursive feedback loops between 
market practice and regulation. Indeed, the concept of financial stability itself is a dynamic 
and contextual one, as “it is considered a continuum: changeable over time and consistent 
with multiple combinations of the constituent elements of finance.”8 Such an intensive 
concern for financial stability thus entails a reform of the regulatory framework as it is 
increasingly accepted that the management of financial risks is no longer a private matter but 
a public concern.9  
 
One approach to achieve this objective is to promote experimental governance. As will be 
discussed in further detail in the following sections, experimentation from local points to a 
wider scope under the hierarchical state structure with a strong central control has long been 
informing the decision making process of the central government in China.10 The fact that 
China faced a very unusual problem when it created its securities market in the 1990s from a 
planned economy has important implications on the later evolution of the Chinese securities 
market. China may accordingly follow an evolutionary path different from the west. The 
transition of the Chinese economy from a planned economy with a strong central control to 
the current socialist market economy is unprecedented. A strictly planned economy suffered 
from information asymmetry and distorted incentive mechanisms arising from the centrally 
controlled pricing system and resource allocation system. The market had no real role to play 
in resource allocation and so the traditional technique of developing regulatory rules (in the 
west) through market failure and cost-benefit analysis could not be applied since there was 
no market in place and therefore no concept of market failure. In that kind of environment 
experimentation has stronger attractions than in a system where there is already some form 
of market system in place (for capital as well as the underlying markets for other factors of 
                                                   
8 See Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (supra n 2) at 1. 
9 Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Financial Stability and Legal Integration in Financial 
Regulation’ (2013) 38 E.L. Rev. 335; Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Future of 
Financial Regulation – Governance for Responsibility, (Routledge, 2014); Christian Kopf, ‘Restoring 
Financial Stability in the EURO Area’, CEPS Policy Brief No.237 (2011). 
10 It is noted that experimentalist governance promoted in the west however is of a polyarchic 
nature and thus is different from the experimentation conducted in China, where strong central 
control under the Nomenklature System and a hierarchical administrative system is apparent. 
Moreover, experimentation in China usually begins without corresponding laws. Instead, 
administrative policies from different levels in the administrative system are the norm. See Charles F. 
Sabel, Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Experimentalist Governance’ in David Levi-Faur (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Governance, (OUP 2012) 169-186,. 
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production such as land, labour, and natural resources).  
 
Given that China has been enjoying the benefits arising from experimentation with 
economic development policies it is not surprising that experimentation on the regulation of 
the securities market has also been attempted. However, partly because the central 
government underestimated the negative impacts or was overconfident in controlling the 
securities market, the initial connivance from the central government on the development of 
local securities markets only led to a race to bottom among segmented local securities 
markets, which seriously undermined the stability of the national securities market. The 
notorious incident of 10 August 1992 in Shenzhen finally pressed the central government to 
strangle the rampant growth of local securities markets and to introduce the sole national 
regulator for the national securities market, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC).11 The government has since then focused its efforts on the development of the two 
national stock exchanges. Gradually, the incremental keen demand for financing of SMEs was 
also recognized and considered in this process by introducing the SME Board and the Growth 
Board, or Chinext, onto the ShenZhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). However, the overly stringent 
listing standards on both the SME Board (which are almost similar to those on the two 
national stock exchanges) and the Chinext (which are still too harsh for SMEs even though 
they are more lenient in comparison with those of the SME Board) may in fact close the door 
of the two national stock exchanges to most SMEs who require financing.12 This situation, in 
combination with the fact that both the formal stock exchanges and the existing banking 
system have historically been focused on the SOE-dominated national economy, severely 
constrains the financing for private enterprises, especially local SMEs. 13  Within such a 
context, the development of the multi-tier securities market thus attracted the attention of 
the central government.14  
                                                   
11 See infra, section B. 
12 This can be observed by the difference among the listing rules on the different boards. 
13 Non-performing loans extended to SOEs have constrained the capacity of the banking system to 
finance SMEs. See World Bank and International Monetary Fund, ‘China: Financial Sector Assessment’ 
Washington, DC: World Bank and IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program, 2011, available at 
<http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/WB-Chinas-Financial-Sector-Asse
ssment-Report.pdf> accessed 19 November 2015 
14 Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the 
Reform, passed on 12 November 2013 at the 3rd plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (CCCPC) The development of the multi-tier capital market in general has 
been emphasized in both the 12th and the recent (framework for) 13th 5-year plan for national economic 
and social development. See Premier LI Keqiang: Promoting the Healthy Development of Multi-tier 
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While there are a large number of articles on the contribution of experimentation to 
economic development in China, we focus on a specific segment of China’s financial market – 
the local securities exchanges established at the provincial level. It is worth noting to begin 
with that local securities markets may serve several purposes. First, they provide additional 
financing channels for locally established enterprises. This may be achieved not only by 
providing the local SMEs with equity financing via improving liquidity of shares of quoted 
companies but also by providing alternative financing sources, for instance, private 
placement, secondary equity offering, credit enhancement and loans on equity. Second, local 
securities markets offer more investment opportunities for investors who are less risk averse. 
Third, local securities markets may create pools of seed enterprises to be listed on trading 
centres or exchanges at higher levels. The development of a multi-tier capital market to 
facilitate financing for enterprises with different financial demands is thus an impending and 
indispensable requirement for the sustainable development of the Chinese national 
economy. 
 
We aim to provide a timely study of how experimentation has been and is being 
conducted, focusing on the institutional dynamics of the process and its implications for the 
future evolution of the Chinese securities market. Viewed from that perspective, China is a 
meaningful reference point for the EU and the wider international community. However, 
China is also unique in several aspects. First, state intervention has long been established 
while in the west the recurrent financial crises and their implications for the economy as a 
whole have already led to calls for more effective government intervention in financial 
markets that have historically been less intensely regulated. 15  How can the financial 
regulatory framework evolve as China’s economy, including the financial market, becomes 
increasingly integrated with the international community? Second, compared with other 
jurisdictions, the financial market in China is still in its incipient stage. Given the de facto 
federalism16 in China, it is interesting to review the evolution of regulation of the financial 
                                                                                                                                                              
Capital Market, 7 March 2016, Securities Times, 
<http://kuaixun.stcn.com/2016/0307/12613826.shtml#> accessed 15 June 2015. 
15 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jaime Jaramillo-Vallejo, and Yung Chal Park, ‘The role of the state in 
financial markets’ World Bank Research Observer, Annual Conference on Development Economics 
Supplement (1993) 19-61. 
16 Yongnian Zheng, De Facto Federalism in China Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local 
Relations (Beijing: World Scientific 2006).   
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markets. As the current regulatory scheme grants local governments an important role in 
local equity markets, our research will contribute to the understanding of de facto federalism 
in China and further elaborate the new characteristics of local-central relations in the 
financial market as the legal system matures. A prominent feature is competition between 
local governments for comparative advantage in their relations with the central government. 
Third, in the light of the recent focus on experimentation in the US and the EU17, the 
evolution of the regulatory framework of the local equity markets in China may better help us 
understand the relationship between “minimalism and experimentalism in the 
administrative state.”18  
 
In contrast with the conventional focus on economically developed areas, we focus in 
particular on regional/local equity markets in one economically less developed province – 
LiaoNing in north-eastern China. 19  While national strategies on regional economic 
development have long been in place, positive results remain elusive. 20  In fact, local 
governments in economically less developed areas may be doubly constrained. For one thing, 
their enterprises may suffer a more severe demand for financing due to a shortage of funding 
from banks, which may press the local governments to be bolder to explore riskier methods 
of financing. For another, due to the inertia of the local political and economic context and 
the concern for career development on the part of local governors, they may simply be 
rule-transplantees or passive followers of other leading provinces. In other words, local 
governments of economically less developed areas may have more convoluted motives to 
compete and/or collaborate with their peers to maximize their individual local interests 
either directly or indirectly by having a share of the interests of a larger region at provincial 
or even regional level. Alternatively, it is also interesting to observe how the central 
                                                   
17 See supra n 10 and accompanying text. 
18 Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, ‘Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State’, (2010). Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 9187, 
available at <http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia_pllt/9187> accessed 19 November 2015. 
19 We mainly deal with two local exchanges in this article, i.e., the LiaoNing Equity Exchange 
(LNEE) and the DaLian Equity Exchange (DLEE), both in LiaoNing province. 
20 The working group on the development of western China started in 2000 and the policy was 
approved in Fifth Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The 
National Strategy to Rejuvenate Old Industrial Bases of north-eastern China was introduced in 2006 
by the central government. 
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government promotes the development of local financial markets whereas at the same time it 
seeks to avoid the serious concern of a “race to the bottom” in terms of market integrity and 
investor protection. 
 
It might well be argued that an empirical research of LEEs is premature at this stage. 
However, the shortage of rules on the regional/local equity markets at the national level 
provides a valuable opportunity to detect and map the evolutionary path of regulations for 
those markets in the coming years. Indeed, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, markets do not occur 
naturally but require to be supported by the state in some way (even if not formally 
regulated).21 The role of the state is particularly evident in China since the capacity for the 
spontaneous emergence and private-ordering of markets envisaged by Hayek 22  is 
constrained by the central government. The development of the multi-tier capital market was 
inserted in the 12th national 5-year plan and several important and concrete measures have 
been introduced to promote the objective.23 In comparison with the regulatory approach to 
the national New Third Board,24 the central government and the CSRC have already opined 
that trading of shares of non-listed local companies shall be regulated by local provincial 
governments and that local provincial governments shall assume a larger role in promoting 
regional equity markets.25 
 
                                                   
21 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 
(Boston: Beacon Press 2001 [1944]).   
22 Hayek claimed that markets are capable of creating spontaneous order and that state 
interference will disrupt the just outcomes that would otherwise result from the operation of the 
market. See F A Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice, vol 2 of Law, Legislation and Liberty, 
(Routledge 1979) at Ch 2. 
23 The General Office of the State Council (SCGO) issued Implementation Opinions on Financial 
Support to Develop Small and Micro Enterprises ( SCGO [2013] Circular No. 87), in which the 
development of Regional Equity Market has been identified among the measures to provide direct 
financing channels to small and micro-sized enterprises. See SCGO [2013] Circular No. 87, 
Implementation Opinions on Financial Supports to Develop Small and Micro Enterprises.  
24 See infra section D 4. 
25 CSRC [2001] Circular No.5Opinions on the Trust of Securities of Non-listed Public Companies, 
stating that: “due to the complexity and the wide scale of the issue, the redress work shall be carried 
out by local governments.” 
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Our article is structured as follows. In Part B we provide a high-level account of the role 
of experimentation in the development of securities markets in China. In Part C we link that 
process to the unique features of the institutional structure in China. The policy and 
regulatory framework surrounding the development of the local securities trading centers is 
set out in Part D. In Part E we focus on two case studies of formation and operation of Local 
Equity Exchanges (LEEs) in Liaoning Province. Part F concludes.  
 
B. EXPERIMENTATION ON CHINA’S SECURITIES MARKET 
At the time when the Communist Party of China (CPC) announced the reform and 
opening-up policy in the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC in 
1978, a decision which triggered the long phase of economic development in the following 
years, the concept of market economy was still of utmost ideological importance. 26  A 
common recognition as a result of heated debates on this issue was that both market and plan 
were merely methods to achieve high efficiency in resource allocation.27 In other words, 
socialist countries can also develop the market economy to improve productivity. 28 
Nevertheless, there was no predetermined itinerary when Deng announced to his citizenry 
that “To get rich is glorious” and “It is permitted to make a group of people to get rich first.”29 
                                                   
26 This was the well-known debate which persisted until the early 1990s over whether the 
surname of the Chinese economy was capitalist or socialist. See Shaoguang Wang, ‘Learning by 
Debating: The Changing Role of the State in China’s Economy and Economics Theories’ (1995) 23 
Policy Studies Journal 11. 
27 This was especially the case when the Tiananmen Square incident happened in 1989. Deng 
Xiaoping stated clearly in several talks that both market and plan are tools or methods to achieve the 
development of economy. See Guangxiang Wu, ‘The Herald to Deng’s Talk in his Southern Trip, The 
Four Comments on Reform’, available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/8167608.html> 
accessed 19 November 2015. 
28 The concept of socialist market economy did not emerge until the 14th National Congress of the 
CPC in 1992, ’China's central government decision on resolving several problems concerning the 
establishment of a socialist market economic system,’ Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) (17 November 
1993). 
29 The paradox in the claim with the established understanding of communism was later revealed 
in an interview with Deng in his eighties, who said:  
“The main task in the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces, keep increasing the 
material wealth of society, steadily improve the life of the people and create material conditions for the 
advent of a communist society. There can be no communism with pauperism, or socialism with 
pauperism. 
So to get rich is no sin. However, what we mean by getting rich is different from what you mean. 
Wealth in a socialist society belongs to the people. To get rich in a socialist society means prosperity for 
the entire people. The principles of socialism are: first, development of production and second, 
 9 
One scholar observed that “Even the slogan mo shitou guohe (crossing the river by stepping 
from stone to stone) exaggerates the systemic component of China’s early reforms by 
suggesting a firm objective – the far bank of the river – where none existed.”30  
 
To explore the unchartered sea under the socialist canopy, China first separated several 
special economic zones (SEZs), where Township Village Enterprises (“TVEs”) were highly 
promoted.31 A generally accepted practice among TVEs in this period was that promoters 
made contributions in both capital and labour, an indicator of shareholding in its embryonic 
form.32 Such a method to pool capital was then accepted and promoted by the central 
government among other private enterprises.33  
 
With the success of these initial shareholding explorations in SEZs and villages, the CPC 
announced its “Decision on the Reform of the Economic System” in 1984 to promote a mixed 
economy with a role for both private and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy. 
Subsequently, the shareholding experimentation in villages was extended to cities, where 
SOEs joined to pilot the shareholding experimentation as an alternative route to 
reorganization of SOEs.34 In adherence to the philosophy of gradualism, reorganizations via 
shareholding experimentation were first carried on among small and medium sized SOEs. It 
                                                                                                                                                              
common prosperity. We permit some people and some regions to become prosperous first, for the 
purpose of achieving common prosperity faster. That is why our policy will not lead to polarization, to a 
situation where the rich get richer while the poor get poorer." 
See Patrick Whiteley, ‘The Era of Prosperity is upon us’, China Daily, (19 Oct 2009), available at 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-10/19/content_6243676.htm> accessed 19 November 
2015.  
30 Thomas Rawski, ‘Implications of China’s Reform Experience’, 1995 China Quarterly 1150, 
1151-2.  
31 The first public offer of share-like certificate (share certificate) was made by a Shenzhen TVE, 
the Baoan County Joint Investment Company in 1983. In the following year, an SOE in Beijing – 
Beijing Tianqiao Department Store - was converted into a company limited by shares.  
32 Some would only contribute labour whereas others only capital. 
33 The Central Committee of the CPC, The Notification on the Work of Village by the Central 
Committee of the CPC 1984, even promoted such activities. Peasants and collectives were permitted to 
circulate their capital freely without boundary restrictions. Peasants were encouraged to invest in 
different enterprises via shares and to pool their capital to set up different organizations, especially 
those with a developmental objective. The State committed itself to protect the legal interests of such 
investments. See Guangyao Shi, Qi Zhang, Guofang Liu, and Haifeng Hu, The Miracle of Capital – the 
Review and Envision of the 20 Years of Chinese Securities Market, (Beijing: Economic Science Press 
2010) at 26-7. 
34 As a result of SOE restructuring, the company as an organizational form was introduced when 
Beijing Tianqiao Department Store and Shanghai Feile Acoustics Company came into being in 1984.  
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was not until December 1986 when the State Council promulgated the Several Stipulations on 
Deepening the Reform and Enhancing the Vitality of Enterprises that shareholding 
experimentation was explored among big and medium sized SOEs. 
 
Another reason contributing to the wide experimentation among SOEs was that banks 
had already been heavily burdened with a large amount of bad debts of SOEs in this 
restructuring period.35 Given such an embarrassing financial situation, alternative financing 
sources had to be located by the government to alleviate the financing concern of its SOEs. 
Despite this, the acceptance of shareholding was not easy. Indeed, given that the assets of 
SOEs belong to the people collectively, the concept of shares as a form of private property was 
ideologically in conflict with the then widely established understanding of property 
ownership under the centrally planned economy. It is thus no wonder to read in one 
document issued by the State Council (SC) in 1986: 
 
Enterprises wholly owned by the people shall not offer their shares to the public. 
For those big and mid-sized SOEs which have already been approved to explore the 
shareholding, the local governments in concern shall have a detailed review and 
purge, and for those which still need to continue issue shares to the public, local 
branches of the PBOC must review strictly.36 
 
In addition, the concept of share was not clear. Shares were not equity in the western 
legal sense but merely an alternative choice to energize the then moribund SOEs. In fact, 
shares issued during this period of time were more like bonds with variable dividends. 
Moreover, even if shares were bought, they were held for the long-term rather than for the 
purpose of being traded. Given the stronghold of SOEs and the belief among investors in the 
creditworthiness of the government in the past, this understanding was acceptable as the 
government was expected to pay the unpaid capital and dividends in the event of bad 
operating performance. However, such debt-like shares were still riskier than Treasury bonds 
backed explicitly by the State and thus unpopular among risk-averse investors even if they 
were provided with interest rates higher than that provided by bank deposits. The 
evolutionary path changed abruptly when investors of the Shenzhen Development Bank, the 
                                                   
35 It is observed that fiscal subsidies to bad performing SOEs exceeded RMB140 billion in 1980. 
This led to the dominant financing role of banks who struggled to meet demand for loans despite 
growth in their deposits. See further Shi, et al, The Miracle of Capital (supra n 33) at 27-8. 
36 Art 2 of the Notification on Enhancing the Administration of Stocks and Debentures, SC No.22 
[1987].  
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first Chinese financial institution limited by shares, found that a share for which they paid 
RMB20 could reap a cash dividend of RMB7, a two for one stock dividend, and a one-for-one 
stock split at the year end.37 Similar exhilarating announcements of companies in other areas 
began to attract speculative investors despite the government’s warning of the investment 
risk. China then experienced a share fever at the end of the 1980s.   
 
During this period of time the People’s Bank of China (and its local branches) was the 
main regulator. Without a clear regulatory framework from the centre, such spontaneous 
experimentations with the corporation as an organizational form and the issuance and 
trading of securities were energetically promoted by local governments in this period with 
support from local branches of the PBOC.38 Securities companies also began to develop in 
this period of time. In 1985, Shenzhen established with the approval of the People’s Bank of 
China the first professional securities company in China, Shenzhen Securities Inc., to engage 
in the trading of securities issued by Shenzhen enterprises. With the approval of the local 
branches of the PBOC, 39  more than 20 provinces, autonomous regions and special 
municipalities established their own securities companies afterwards, which further 
contributed to the development of the securities market.40 
 
The June 4th Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 reverted the trajectory of economic 
reform to the ideological debate on whether the reform would ultimately lead China to 
capitalism.41  However, this incident only held up rather than setback the shareholding 
                                                   
37 See Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, “To Get Rich is Glorious!” – China’s Stock Markets in 
the ‘80s and ‘90s (NY: Palgrave, 2001) at 6-7. The authors observe (at 7) that “its shares skyrocketed 
from a year end price of RMB40 to RMB120 just before June 4 and ended the year at RMB90, the June 
interruption notwithstanding. In the late 1980s these sums were very big money”. 
38 Informal (OTC) trading of shares was first observed in Shenyang in 1986 and then followed by 
other areas. 
39 According to (xi) of Article 5 the Provisional Regulation on the Administration of Bank of PRC 
promulgated by the SC on January 7 1986, “the PBOC has the power to administer such securities as 
enterprise bonds and stocks, administer the financial market.” It should be noted that local branches of 
the PBOC have stronger ties with local governments than with their common headquarter in Beijing.  
40 See Shi, et al, The Miracle of Capital (supra n 33) at 26-27. 
41 While this ideological debate is no longer a serious concern, the development of the socialist 
market economy in China has been shaped primarily “through elite disagreement over the appropriate 
relationship between state and market, and resembles an ad-hoc series of compromises between 
neo-liberal reformers on the right and the socialist left rather than a coherent “China model” of 
development.” See Orion A. Lewis and Jessica C. Teets, ‘A China Model? - Understanding the 
Evolution of a “Socialist Market Economy”’, August 2009, Glasshouse Forum.  
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experimentation, which was tactically employed to introduce a modern enterprise system 
albeit that the function of the securities market in terms of public offering and trading 
securities was intentionally marginalized. Indeed in February 1989, State Committee for the 
Restructuring of the National Economic System (SCRES) emphasized that public offering of 
shares was not the focus of the shareholding reform42; rather, the purpose of shareholding 
experimentation was to introduce the modern enterprise system by clarifying rights and 
responsibilities of the management. Six months later, the State Council promulgated the 
Notification on Public Offering Shares, which constrained, rather than prohibited, the public 
offering of shares within Shanghai and Shenzhen only. As a result, shareholding 
experimentation in other provinces almost all came to a stop. In parallel, another document 
issued in May 1990 by the SCRES also expressed a conservative attitude towards the 
development of the shareholding system at this specific juncture. After emphasizing the 
importance of the Contract Responsibility system,43 the SCRES stated at the end of the 
document that the shareholding experimentation shall be carried on but three situations 
should be differentiated: 1) cross shareholding among enterprises shall be promoted; 2) 
employee shareholding programs shall be limited to their existing scale and no more 
experimentation of employee shareholding shall be promoted; and 3) no more 
experimentation of public offering can be accepted.44 The upshot of these policies was that 
OTC45 trading was permitted within Shanghai and Shenzhen only, which however paved the 
way to the establishment of the two formal stock exchanges months later.  
 
                                                   
42 See State Committee for the Restructuring of the National Economic System, The Notification 
on Enhancing the Supervision of the Organization to Safeguard the Healthy Development of the 
Explored Shareholding, (Telegram 15 February 1989).  
43 This refers to the extension of the contracting out system in the rural areas to the SOEs. In rural 
areas, peasants were allowed accordingly to produce and sell freely once they sold a given amount at 
the prices fixed by the state, a system which produced the high growth rate of the rural economy. Such 
experimentation was later extended to industrial enterprises. According to the Contract Responsibility 
System, the state held ownership whereas the management team was incentivized to improve 
performance: see Anthony Koo, ‘The Contract Responsibility System: Transition from a Planned to a 
Market Economy’ (1990) 38 Economic Development and Cultural Change 797. 
44 Art 29 Opinions on Deepening Enterprise Reform and Enhancing Enterprise Administration in 
the Process of Improvement and Rectification April 10 1990, approved and promulgated by the SC on 
23 May 1990.  
45 OTC (“over the counter”) refers to trading outside formally constituted markets. In China, 
however, OTC refers to any trading outside the national market system. In the west, OTC is primarily 
associated with derivatives, Eurobonds and wholesale money markets in which bilateral rather than 
exchange-based trading is the norm.    
 13 
An unintended consequence of the June 4th incident was that the government merely 
gave up the initial choice of Beijing as the venue of its first stock exchange in China.46 In the 
light of  the political environment, “[t]he prospect of having socially sensitive securities 
trading located throughout the country, much less Beijing, was unacceptable to the 
government at this point.” 47  The introduction of formal stock exchanges and then 
constraining rather than suffocating the experimentation of the securities market was thus a 
choice of a lesser evil. The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) was finally recognized in 
December 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in July 1991, albeit that the SZSE 
had already started to operate at the beginning of 1990.48  
 
Notably, both stock exchanges were regulated by the local branch of the PBOC and the 
local government of each city. Stocks issued and traded on these two exchanges were also 
those of local companies. 49  Viewed from this perspective, the stock exchanges were 
established with a strong local nature. Nevertheless, the commitment of the central 
government to further promote the shareholding experimentation could still be observed 
when it issued its Opinions on Standardization of Joint Stock Companies in May 1992.50 
However, an incident in Shenzhen on 10 August 1992 might well have aborted the initial 
efforts to introduce securities markets into China. As a practice in those days, investors who 
wanted to subscribe for shares were required first to acquire necessary forms for such 
subscription. However, when tens of thousands of investors who had lined up overnight were 
told in the morning that such forms had run out, a riot erupted in the city despite a 
subsequent release of more such forms. With the memory of the Tiananmen Square incident 
still fresh, the August 10 incident in Shenzhen drove the country into a heated ideological 
                                                   
46 This was suggested by the Joint Office of Research and Design of Stock Exchange (established 
by students who studied abroad) on 15 March 1989. See Shi, et al., The Miracle of Capital (supra n 33) 
at 39. 
47 See Walter and Howie, “To Get Rich is Glorious!” (supra n 37) at 8. 
48 This is not to say that Shenzhen did not apply to establish the first Stock Exchange. However, 
no public information is available as to why the application from the Shenzhen Municipal government 
was postponed. However, it seems that Shenzhen may have suffered from starting operations prior to 
official approval whereas the Shanghai exchange was envisaged as a formal process of experimentation 
endorsed by the central government. See Zhangze LI, ‘The Exploration and Operation of the SZSE’, 
Securities Times 22 Oct 2010, available at 
<http://zt.stcn.com/content/2010-10/22/content_1459856.htm> accessed 10 June 2015 
49 There were 30 securities listed on the SHSE, i.e., 5 treasury bonds, 8 enterprise bonds, 9 
finance bonds, 8 stocks (7 from Shanghai companies and 1 from Zhejiang). All companies listed on 
SZSE were local companies. 
50 SCRES, Opinions on Standardization of Joint Stock Companies, 15 May 1992. 
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debate.  
 
However, it was again Deng (this time on his southern trip to Shenzhen) who expelled 
any doubt hanging over the development of the securities market in China.51 Encouraged by 
the decisiveness of the central government, the State Council extended the exploration of 
public offering of shares and trading of securities on Exchanges in three provinces 
(Guangdong, Fujian and Hainan) and two cities (Shanghai and Shenzhen) to thirty provinces 
and fourteen cities under separate plans.52 A quota system and a review and approval system 
were also introduced at the same time.53 The two original stock exchanges with a strong 
local nature thus began their metamorphosis into national exchanges. 
 
It should be noted that at the time when the two stock exchanges were established, there 
was no company law much less securities law in China: the relevant legal frameworks only 
took effect in 1993 and 1999 respectively. The regulatory framework was established through 
decisions, opinions of the Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC), the SCRES at the centre, 
the local branches of PBOC or the local governments. The rampant growth of OTC trading in 
discrete localities and the notorious August 10 incident thus pressed for a strong central 
regulator. For that purpose, the SC established the Securities Committee of the SC and the 
CSRC in 1992. As a newly-born institution the CSRC’s legitimacy was first established with 
help from the central government (the Securities Committee of the SC) to coordinate with 
the then existing multiple regulators. 54  With the promulgation of the Provisional 
Regulations on the Administration of Securities Exchanges in 1993 and the adoption of its 
                                                   
51 Deng said: ‘Are such things as securities and stock markets good or not? Are they dangerous? 
Do these things exist only in capitalist system and can socialist ones use them too? It is permitted to try 
them out, but it must be done in a determined fashion’. See Changjiang Li, The History and 
Development of China’s Securities Markets, (Beijing: Zhongguo Wuzi Chubanshe, 1998) at 86.  
52 The SC promulgated the Notice of Further Strengthening the Macro-Administration of the 
Securities Market on 17 December 1992.  
53 Accordingly, JSCs which applied for public offering of their shares should first secure approval 
from these local governments, and then go through the review and approval of the CSRC and the 
review and approval of the stock exchanges. 
54 Walter and Howie identified three stages through which the CSRC established its authority as 
the sole regulator of the securities market: 1992-93 marked the establishment and consolidation of 
authority over the securities and future markets and extension of investigatory and enforcement 
powers; 1996 marked the CSRC’s assumption of full control over the two securities exchanges; and in 
1998 the CSRC became a full ministry-level organization empowered by the 1999 Securities Law. See 
Walter and Howie, “To Get Rich is Glorious!” (supra n 37) at 11. 
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final version in 1996,55 the CSRC began to enjoy sole-regulator status. The Provisional 
Regulations vested in the CSRC the power to supervise exchanges within the country, which 
included 1) the power to nominate and remove directors and the general manager of the 
exchanges; 2) the power to investigate matters related to the exchanges and the settlement 
companies; 3) the power to review and approve the products and services to be provided on 
the exchanges; and 4) the power to review, and demand to change if it thinks necessary, the 
operation of the stock exchanges and related services.56 The status and power of the CSRC 
was later confirmed in 1999 when the Securities Law of the PRC came into power. 
 
During this evolutionary process, the Chinese securities market experienced the single 
regulator model under the control of the PBOC in its initial stage, then the multiple-regulator 
model in the transitional period, and finally the national sole-regulator model under the 
control of the CSRC. Viewed retrospectively, this evolution is in tune with the development 
of the Chinese securities market. In the initial stage, when there were merely spontaneous 
explorations at the local levels, the PBOC held the power to supervise the financial market as 
a whole. With the emergence of the securities market, the intervention of the local 
governments and the regulation of the local branches of the PBOC were necessary in the 
absence of national regulatory rules. Once the national regulators came to intervene, we 
observe the involvement of the PBOC, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Committee of the 
CPC, the State Committee of Restructuring National Economy and the State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange. The process was one of partitioning the emerging administrative power 
over an increasingly important market. However, the unregulated local markets, the 
inefficiency of the multiple-regulator model, the systemic importance of the securities 
market for the financial system and the experience from other countries all contributed to 
the ultimate single regulator model that now operates in the securities market in China.57 
 
                                                   
55 Securities Committee of the SC, Regulations on the Administration of Stock Exchanges, 21 
August 1996.  
56 The rules thus required the stock exchanges to be subject to the regulation of the CSRC rather 
than the local government and the local branch of the PBOC. However, while SZSE undertook 
proactive compliance by referring to the CSRC directly, SHSE did not. For the different responses from 
the SHSE and SZSE to the adjustment to be made to their Articles of Association, see Walter and 
Howie, “To Get Rich is Glorious!” (supra n 37) at 77-8. 
57 The single regulator for the securities market (the CSRC) operates within a system in which 
regulatory responsibility for banking lies with the PBOC and for insurance with the CIRC. See generally 
Hui Huang, ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the Global 
Financial Crisis’ (2010) 10 JCLS 219. 
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C. EXPERIMENTATION IN THE SUI GENERIS CONTEXT OF CHINA 
In a rule of law jurisdiction, path dependence in the legal system and the priority given to 
legal certainty may in fact frustrate experimentation in rule making.58 In such a jurisdiction, 
the stickiness of the institutions, especially the legislative and political framework, means 
that small scale discrete experimentations and ex post automatic reviews of existing 
legislation designed to improve the adaptability of the regulatory system to the development 
of the real world may be favoured over introducing new laws driven by political pressure.59 
Romano therefore advocates that legislative tools such as sunset clauses and 
experimentation be adopted so as to provide “a feedback loop measuring and remedying 
regulatory errors.”60 
 
In comparison, China may not suffer from such institutional stickiness as the lack of a 
sound rule of law system in China provides a conducive environment for discretionary and 
experimental administrative policies before laws and regulations are enacted.61 Still, the 
approach conducted in China can only be properly understood within its special institutional 
environment, of which the following are of special importance. The first is the de facto 
federalism,62 or the regionally decentralized governance system, which is defined as “a 
combination of political centralization and economic regional decentralization.”63 The de 
facto federalism is different from the federalism in the US, where each state has its own 
legislative power and where legal rule competition is an inherent nature of state competition. 
Local governments in China enjoy only limited legislative power of making regulations 
                                                   
58 See Zachary J Gubler, ‘Experimental Rules’ (2014) 55 B.C. L. Rev. 129, at 139-141. While the 
federalism in the US may provide a favourable environment for large scale experimentation, the 
promotion of experimental rules became widespread in the UK only since 1997: see Performance and 
Innovation Unit ‘Adding It Up: Improving Analysis and Modelling in Central Government’ (London: 
Cabinet Office 2000); Roger Jowell, ‘Trying It Out – The Role of ‘Pilots’ in Policy-Making’, 
(Government Chief Social Researcher’s Office 2003), at 8-9.  
59 Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in Cary Coglianese, ed., Regulatory Breakdown: The 
Crisis of Confidence in U.S. Regulation (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), at 4-5. 
60 Roberta Romano, ‘Further Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation: A Postscript to 
Regulating in the Dark’, ECGI Working Paper N°. 273/2014, available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517853> accessed 19 November 2015, at 1. 
61 Sebastian Heilmann, ‘Experimentation under Hierarchy: Policy Experiments in the 
Reorganization of China’s State Sector, 1978-2008’, (2008)Working Paper No.172 of the Center for 
International Development at Harvard University.  
62 See Zheng, De Facto Federalism (supra n 16). 
63 Chenggang Xu, ‘The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development’ (2011) 49 
Journal of Economic Literature 1077.  
 17 
(rather than laws) which can neither be in conflict with the laws nor exceed the boundaries 
established in laws or regulations created by a legislative agency at a higher level.64 It is true 
that when the target sector is unregulated, local governments may enjoy discretion in the 
initial stage of the reform. However, the strong central government within such a de facto 
federalism may easily control the timing, the substance and the progress of experimentation 
at local levels.65 Accordingly, free competition among different rule providers is seriously 
constrained in China. 
 
The second feature is the Nomenklatura system, which was transplanted from the Soviet 
Union but well maintained in China until today. The Nomenklatura system refers to the 
institutional arrangements on personnel management, through which the Party has the 
power to make appointments to and decides the list of potential candidates for key positions 
both in the government and the party’s own hierarchy.66 The Nomenklatura system covers a 
wide range of personnel from political positions to positions in judiciary organs, academic 
institutions and enterprises, including all top staff on the regulatory bodies and the senior 
staff on the two national stock exchanges.67 The Nomenklatura system may in fact establish a 
set of strong and effective norms constraining behaviour of agents, which is important for a 
jurisdiction without a sound legal system but may tend to prioritise consensus over consistent 
policy-making.68  
 
Figure 1. The Nomenklatura System in China 
                                                   
64 Legislation Law of the PRC 2015, Article 72 and 73 
65 See Heilmann, Experimentation under Hierarchy (supra n 61) at 4.  
66 See generally John Burns, ‘China’s Nomenklatura System’ (1987) 33 Problems of Communism 
36. 
67 For a list of the job titles covered, see Burns (supra n 66). A related concept is BianZhi, which is 
usually translated into “establishment.” The two concepts are different. BianZhi is intended to clarify 
what departments and positions are included in an administrative setup whereas the Nomenklatura 
system determines which job titles are under the party control. Since 1980, the system has already 
been extended to party committees at lower levels. See Kjeld Brødsgaard (2012) ‘Cadre and Personnel 
Management in the CPC’, 10 China: An Int’l J. 69.    
68 See Heilmann, ‘Experimentation under Hierarchy’ (supra n 61) at 2. 
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Figure reproduced from Kjeld Brødsgaard, ‘Cadre and Personnel Management in the 
CPC’69 
 
Experimentation in China must therefore be understood as “experimentation under 
hierarchy,” a policy experimentation process within the de facto federalism and the strong 
hierarchical Nomenklatura system.70 Within such a world, the centre enjoys an incomparable 
advantage, by comparison both with other jurisdictions and local governments within China, 
in understanding and constantly monitoring the non-linear feedback dynamics that follow 
the introduction of a policy by the local governments.71  
 
The third feature is that, in comparison with the West, China is a Party-controlled state 
where there is no concern for recurrent electoral campaigns. It may accordingly have a 
longer-term view and more capacity to accumulate experience before reaching conclusions 
about financial market experiments and appropriate regulatory frameworks. The longer 
time-frame and secure political position of policy makers in China thus facilitated 
institutional transformation.72  
 
The fourth feature is the almost uniform economic, political and governance structure of 
                                                   
69 Figure reproduced from Kjeld Brødsgaard, ‘Cadre and Personnel Management in the CPC’, 
(supra n 67), at 75 
70 Sebastian Heilmann, ‘Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise’ (2006) 43 St Comp Int 
Dev 1.  
71 For a good description of the central-local relations, see Lisheng Dong, ‘Central-Local Relations 
in China: Retrospect and Prospect’ (2007) Discussion Paper 16 China Policy Institute University of 
Nottingham. Deng Xiaoping announced publicly that the centre must have authority over local 
governments. See Deng Xiaoping, ‘The Centre Must Have Authority’, in The Works of Deng Xiaoping, 
(Beijing: Renmin Publishing House, 1993).  
72 See Heilmann, ‘Experimentation under Hierarchy’ (supra n 61) at 16.  
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local governments. While it is true that different provinces may enjoy different natural 
endowments and different heritage from history, the governance structure is almost identical 
across provinces. 73  In fact, provincial economies were more self-sufficient than their 
counterparts in the west since Mao, fearing military invasion from the outside, encouraged 
local self-sufficiency and devolved much planning and administration to provincial cadres.74 
Explorations within such a context may therefore be more meaningful in terms of evaluating 
the effectiveness of the policies. Also, given the variation in the economic power of individual 
provinces, policies that have failed in one province may well be effective in another province 
or policies becoming redundant in one province may well start a new life in another province; 
and both situations may well mitigate the exploration costs. 
 
Figure 2. Stylized Governance Structure of China 
 
Figure reproduced from Xu, ‘The Fundamental Institutions’75 
 
Finally, despite the use of the terminology “Over the Counter (OTC)” to describe informal 
markets in China, the absence of a clear regulatory perimeter comparable to western systems 
means that the term OTC cannot be understood in the same way in China. In the west, the 
regulatory perimeter clearly delineates regulated activities from those that are not regulated, 
albeit that the perimeter may be adjusted over time through legislation in line with the 
prevailing political view of the appropriate balance between market freedom and state 
intervention.76 In China, there is no such clear demarcation, albeit that the OTC market has 
                                                   
73 See Xu, ‘The Fundamental Institutions’ (supra n 63). 
74 See Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, ‘China's Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving 
Federalism, Chinese Style’ (1996) 1 Journal of Policy Reform 149. 
75 See Xu, ‘The Fundamental Institutions’ (supra n 63). 
76 For example, the regulatory perimeter has expanded in Europe and the US in the wake of the 
financial crisis.  
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been more clearly defined in a recent administrative measure as securities trading outside the 
national market system (SHSE and SZSE) and the New Third Board (NEEQ).77 The nature of 
the socialist market economy (and the role of law within such a system) leaves the state (the 
central government and its agencies as well as local governments) with considerable 
discretionary powers of intervention. Thus, innovation and experimentation in such a system 
occurs in the shadow of the state in a much more direct manner than occurs in the west and 
the characterization of the OTC market as a self-regulating domain is much less relevant.    
 
Experimentation within such a sui generis Chinese context can therefore be 
characterised as diagnostics before prescription, according to which local incentives are 
generated for policy competition and institutional innovation. 78  On the other hand, 
communication between the local and the central government is also safeguarded. The 
central government can in this process garner information on both failure and success 
through reports and paroling officials from the central authority and thus constrain the 
negative effects of bad policies and expand the benefits of good ones.79 To a large extent, 
political opposition to new reforms has also been pacified by the learning processes generated 
through the regional experimentation.80 This process cannot be simply labelled as top-down 
or bottom-up. Rather, it is a dynamic adaptation given the specific local situation.81 On this, 
Bakhshi et al aptly articulate that “any experiment is a hypothesis test” and “the point is not 
to prove that something is correct, ……, but rather to discover what was not known, and then 
                                                   
77 See the National Securities Association, Administrative Measures on File for Record of OTC 
Securities Business, effective 1st September 2015. This definition does not in itself adjust or clarify the 
regulatory perimeter, nor does it protect OTC activity from retrospective regulatory intervention.  
78 Dani Rodrik, ‘Diagnostics before Prescription’ (2010) 24 J Eco. Perspectives 33; Sebastian 
Heilmann, ‘From local experiments to national policy: the origins of China's distinctive Policy Process” 
(2008) 59 The China Journal 1; Max Boisot and John Child, ‘From Fiefs to Clans and Network 
Capitalism: Explaining China's Emerging Economic Order’ (1996) 41 Administrative Science 
Quarterly 600; Max Boisot and John Child, ‘The Iron Law of Fiefs: Bureaucratic Failure and the 
Problem of Governance in the Chinese Economic Reforms’ (1988) 33 Administrative Science 
Quarterly 507.  
79 Xiao Li, ‘Legal and Economic Development with Sui Generis Chinese Characteristics: A Systems 
Theorist’s Perspective’ (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 159.  
80 See Xu, ‘The Fundamental Institutions’ (supra n 63).   
81 Xufeng Zhu, ‘Mandate versus Championship Vertical Government Intervention and Diffusion 
of Innovation in Public Services in Authoritarian China’ (2014) 16 Public Management Review 117’. 
Such adaptation also happens in the political system: see Wen-Hsuan Tsai and Nicola Dean, 
‘Experimentation under Hierarchy in Local Conditions: Cases of Political Reform in Guangdong and 
Sichuan, China’ (2014) 218 China Quarterly 339.  
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to use that new knowledge for further exploration.”82  
 
Despite the largely successful experience in the past, one side effect of such an 
institutional background is that the sequence of reform in different aspects of economic life is 
largely the intentional choice of the central government. For instance, in comparison with 
other sectors of the economy, reforms on the financial market and the market for land have 
long been intentionally delayed.83 Nevertheless, it is understood that the development of the 
financial market must be adaptable to the national economy as a whole and in turn, financial 
market regulation can only be deemed as means to achieve the macro objective of economic 
and social development.84 Thus, due to the increasing importance of small and medium sized 
enterprises in the sustainable development of the Chinese economy, the development of a 
multi-tier capital market, which is the key to provide multiple financing channels to different 
types of enterprises and multiple investment opportunities for investors with different risk 
preferences, has gradually attracted the attention of the central government. 
 
D. REGULATION OF LOCAL EQUITY EXCHANGES 
1. History 
The initial rampant growth of local stock exchanges (LSEs) has been characterised as an 
experiment of local governments in the mid-1980s to “circumvent conservative opposition 
from Beijing.”85 The upshot was a largely unregulated market overseen by local governments, 
whose regulatory concerns were primarily to require local firms to be quoted on LSEs and to 
cultivate local securities trading companies.86 While the initial efforts of local governments 
                                                   
82 Hasan Bakhshi, Alan Freeman and Jason Potts, 'State of Uncertainty – Innovation Policy 
through Experimentation’, NESTA Provocation 14 April 2011, 
https://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/state_of_uncertainty.pdf, accessed 19 November 2015 at 
11.  
83 The reform of the financial market has been ongoing but slowly and carefully, see Barry 
Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007). The 
reform of the land market is just starting. 
84 See Yifu LIN, New Paradigm for Interpreting the Chinese Economy: Theories, Challenges and 
Opportunities, (Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific Publishing Company 2014).  
85 Stephen Green, China’s Stock Market: A Guide to Progress, Players and Prospects (London: 
Profile Books Ltd 2003) at 154. 
86 Qingshan Tan, ‘State, Institution Building, and Emerging Stock Markets in China’ (2004) 37 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 373, at 374, 378-381.  
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resulted in the establishment of 25 securities trading centres without opposition from the 
central government (under the ideology of Deng Xiaoping), the arrival of Zhu Rongji as 
Premier in 1991 deflected the evolutionary path to that of developing the two national stock 
exchanges on the model of a national securities market.87 
 
During this period local stock exchanges (LSEs) functioned more like brokerage offices 
as the shares traded on these exchanges were those already listed on the SHSE and SZSE. In 
the main, this pattern corresponded with the evolution of local stock exchanges in the UK88 
although it was noted that in addition to Treasury Bonds and local investment funds, no less 
than 12 LSEs also listed the shares of local companies.89 At this stage however LSEs were not 
recognised by the central government and the legal status of LSEs was also dubious. Without 
regulations, many LSEs became highly indebted and the national financial system was also 
seriously segmented into discrete parts.90 Further exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis in 
1997, all the LSEs were required to be purged or closed down according to one Notification 
from the General Office of the State Council (SCGO).91 
 
In fact, the SCGO issued a series of circulars in 1998,92 which outlawed any then existing 
property trading centres operating without prior approval from the SC. Such trading centres 
ranged from property rights trading centres, securities trading centres, automatic quotation 
systems for securities trading to other centres where transactions of shares of non-listed 
companies, equity certificates and other equity-like products were conducted. This campaign 
to purge or close down LSEs came to an end when the life of the last LSE (The HaiNan Stock 
Exchange) was terminated in June 2003. 
                                                   
87 See Green, China’s Stock Market (supra n 85) at 155-6. 
88 See Andrew Leyshon, Nigel Thrift and Caroline Tommey, The Rise of the British Provincial 
Financial Center, (Oxford Pergamon Press 1990). 
89 See Green, China’s Stock Market (supra n 85) at 156. 
90 Ibid, at 155-7. Noticeably, local stock exchanges could still be called as such in this period of 
time as the law did not prohibit such titles. In the later stage, local stock exchanges were all designated 
as Local Equity Exchange or Equity Custody Centre. 
91 The SCGO forwarded the Notification by the CSRC of Measures on Purging and Closing down 
Illegal Transactions of Securities on OTC Market, (SCGO [1998] No.10) hereafter SCGO Circular 
No.10.  
92 In addition to SCGO Circular No.10 (supra n 91) in March, the SCGO forwarded the 
Notification by the CSRC of Measures on Purging and Closing down Securities Operation Institutions, 
(SCGO [1998] No.78) in June; SCGO forwarded the Notification by the CSRC of Measures on Purging 
and Closing down Securities Trading Centers, (SCGO [1998] No.135) in September.  
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However, the demise of the LSEs did not remove the underlying demand for shares of 
non-listed companies to be traded on the OTC market. Indeed, with the support of local 
governments and as a by-product of the SOE reform, local property rights trading centres 
never entirely disappeared from the market. But the main clients of these local property 
rights centres were local SOEs despite the then already developed private economy. Generally, 
transactions were conducted on open markets without a competitive bidding process but with 
a limitation of the listing period on the local property rights trading centres.93 Products 
transacted on these local property rights centres however were not limited to the shares of 
local SOEs but also include precious metals, cultural products94 and other properties.  
 
In spite of such a prohibitive environment, some courageous local property trading 
centres began to experiment with a centralized competitive bidding process and continuous 
trading of products. However, these initiatives only courted more intensive constraints from 
the central government. In 2011, the SC issued Circular No.38 and the SCGO later issued 
Circular No.37.95 With an objective to develop a multi-tier capital market while at the same 
time to mitigate system risks, these two circulars, the drafting of which was dominated by 
the CSRC, were framed as principles with a prohibitive nature. In essence, these latter 
documents establish that only one equity exchange may be established within each 
province.96 The establishment of Local Equity Exchanges (LEEs) must be approved by 
provincial governments. LEEs are expected to function as private placement markets to 
                                                   
93 For example, Art 21 of the Measures of Administering the Transactions of State Owned 
Property Rights of Shandong Province stipulates that the listing period shall not be less than 15 days. 
The Measures are available at 
<http://www.wfcqjy.com/newsinfo.asp?topid=L21&f=%E6%9C%8D%E5%8A%A1%E6%8C%87%E5
%8D%97&s=%E5%B1%B1%E4%B8%9C%E7%9C%81%E7%9B%B8%E5%85%B3%E6%B3%95%E8%
A7%84&img=ibanner04.jpg&newsId=L310310957264564&classid=L2102> accessed 19 November 
2015. 
94 Intellectual property rights were subject to a formal legal regime before securities: Trademarks 
in 1982, Patents in 1984 and Copyright in 1990. These rights could be traded on the LSEs.  
95 Decision of the State Council Concerning the Screening and Rectification of Various Types of 
Trading Venues to Effectively Prevent Financial Risks (Circular No. 38 [2011] of the SC) and 
Implementation Opinions of the SCGO Concerning the Screening and Rectification of Various Types of 
Trading Venues (SCGO Circular No. 37 [2012]).  
96 It is noticeable that local securities trading centers employ the title “Equity Exchange” rather 
than Stock Exchange: the latter is under the coverage of the Securities Law, which stipulates that Stock 
Exchanges must be established with prior approval from the State Council and the CSRC. Some 
interviewees expressed the view that the title “Equity Exchange” may theoretically provide support to 
local governments to evade CSRC regulations.  
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provide financing services to local enterprises by facilitating equity and debenture transfer 
and other financing services. In principle, an LEE cannot establish subsidiaries or branches 
in other provinces nor can it accept quoting applications from companies outside the local 
province. In cases where there is such a demand, the relevant provincial governments shall 
co-monitor the activities if they approve such cross-boundary transactions. LEEs are also 
required to establish administrative systems regulating members of LEEs and rules on the 
admission of investors to the market. In addition, with the approval of the provincial 
government, LEEs are required to make rules on quoting (and de-quoting), rules on 
information disclosure, rules on registration, custody and settlement. 
 
In the following year, the CSRC issued the Guiding Opinions on Regulating Securities 
Companies' Participation in Regional Equity Trading Markets (Provisional),97 which further 
affirmed that the regional OTC markets were an important part of the multi-tier capital 
market.  The resolve of the central government to establish local equity exchanges to support 
the multi-tier capital market has since been further reinforced in a series of documents 
promulgated by the SC.98 
 
2. Central Control of LEEs through Regulation of Intermediaries   
Intermediaries on the multi-tier capital market include securities companies, accounting 
firms, law firms, investment consultancy services firms and credit rating agencies. Among 
those intermediaries, securities companies play a central role in listing, executing 
transactions and advising investors and so we focus on them in this discussion.  
 
According to Circular No.20, securities companies may also participate in share transfer, 
private placement, debenture financing and provide investment consultation services on 
LEEs. Due to the adoption of a “centralized competitive pricing system” on the two national 
stock exchanges, the securities companies act only as agency brokers in securities 
transactions. Laws and administrative regulations prohibit employees of securities 
                                                   
97 CSRC Circular No. 20 [2012] Guiding Opinions on Regulating Securities Companies' 
Participation in Regional Equity Trading Markets (Trial).   
98 The SCGO, Opinions on Promoting Micro and Small Enterprises Financially, SCGO No.87 
[2013]; The CCCPC and the SC, Several Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Institution and 
Hastening the Implementation of Development Strategy Driven by Innovation, in March 2015 and the 
SC, Opinions on Promoting Entrepreneurship and Innovation among Populace, SC No.32 [2015]. 
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companies from participating in securities trading. The market maker system, which plays a 
prominent role in the in the US and UK securities markets, did not have a root to bloom in 
China as it was not favoured in the initial phase of financial development. However, the policy 
changed when the central government started to promote financial innovation and the 
market-maker system was permitted for the New Third Market (NEEQ).99 It remains unclear 
whether or not securities companies can be market makers on LEEs.100 But considering the 
potential contribution of market-makers in improving liquidity of the securities market, it is 
possible that the market-maker system will be launched to revitalize the regional LEEs. 
Indeed, if the market-maker system is introduced into the LEEs, securities companies may 
play a more important role of improving market liquidity by either quoting to both sides of 
the transaction, or seeking and accepting requirements from both transaction parties to reach 
deals,101 or entering into transactions with either side of the transactions using its own capital 
on a continuous basis.102   
 
Apart from securities companies, accounting firms, law firms and other firms which offer 
investment consulting services are usually called securities trading service organizations and 
can provide professional services but are prohibited in securities transactions from acting as 
                                                   
99 The Rules of the National Equities Exchange and Quotations for the Sponsoring Brokers 
Management (Trial) (2013), Article 7 lists the general conditions for securities companies to be a 
market marker on New Third Board (NEEQ). The NEEQ then officially recognized the legality of 
market maker business through the announcement of The National Equities Exchange and Quotations 
Market Maker Business Management (Trial) (2014).  
100 The only LEE which introduced the market maker system is the Tianjin EE which benefits 
from less intervention from the CSRC. See infra section D5 for further information.  
101 According to Article 143 of the Securities Law of PRC 2014, a securities company shall not 
accept the entrustment of discretionary power by a client to decide on the timings, types, quantities 
and prices of securities transactions when conducting brokerage business. This means the securities 
companies could only do what the clients ask them to do, but can’t automatically seek and reach deals 
by representing both transaction parties. 
102 As a result of the three circulars issued by CSRC but forwarded by the SCGO in 1998 (supra n 
92), the norm of three prohibitions, i.e., prohibition on division of an order, prohibition on 
standardization of an order, and prohibition on continuous trading, had been soundly established on 
the equity market. Ever since then, market making business on the securities market has largely been 
prohibited without prior permission from the CSRC. The prohibition was further enhanced by an order 
co-issued by the SASAC and the Ministry of Finance, The Provisional Measures on the Administration 
of Transfer of State Owned Property of Enterprises, SASAC Circular No.3, on 31 December 2003. The 
market maker model only became accepted by the central government in its recent efforts to promote 
mixed ownership to revive the SOE dominated national economy: see State Council, Opinions on 
Developing Mixed Ownership by SOEs, SC Circular No. 54 2015 on 24 September 2015. 
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agents, or purchasing or selling securities by themselves.103 This however can be modified to 
adapt to the development of the LEEs. For instance, qualified accounting firms and law firms 
may secure a licence as a recommendation member, which may entitle the law firm or the 
accounting firm to participate in equity transfer, private placement of bonds, debenture 
financing and to provide investment consultation services on the LNEE.104 Thus, accounting 
firms and law firms may have a broader business scope on the LEEs.  
 
In China, securities business is separated from banking business, trust business and 
insurance business with the result that these activities cannot be combined within the same 
entity.105 However, trust companies, small loan companies, financing guarantee companies 
and other banking institutions are all qualified to be a special member or strategy cooperation 
member of LEEs and can thereby offer support services for the quoted companies across the 
range of activities of the LEEs (including both debt and equity financing).   
 
Table 1. Intermediaries on the Multi-tier Capital Market 
 SHEE and 
SZEE 
The Third Board 
(NEEQ) 
LEE 
Securities 
companies 
√ √ √ 
Accounting firms 
and law firms, etc. 
√ √ √ 
Trust companies, 
small loan 
companies, 
financing 
guarantee 
companies, 
banking 
institutions, etc. 
  √ 
 
                                                   
103 Securities Law of the PRC 2014 Art 171. 
104 The Rules of the Liaoning Equity Exchange Membership Management (Trial) Article 5 and 8. 
105 Securities Law of the PRC 2014 Article 6. 
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3. Local Regulation of LEEs 
With the evolution of the LEEs, it is worth noting the increasingly important role played 
by the Local Financial Office (LFO) in this dynamic evolutionary process.106 The first LFO 
was established in Shanghai in 2002. Today, all 31 provinces and 222 local prefectural cities 
have already set up their own Financial Offices.107 LFOs were initially established with a 
function of liaison and coordination with the PBC, CSRC, CBRC and CIRC and other 
financial institutions. Nowadays, the LFOs have already played an important role in 
introducing local regulations on financial markets, facilitating corporate financing for local 
enterprises, and monitoring local state-owned financial institutions. 
 
As the LFOs are within the organizational chart of local governments, there is no vertical 
hierarchical structure among LFOs at different levels. This may pose a serious concern on 
the power of the central government and accordingly the coherence of regulations on the 
LEEs, rules which are designed by different local governments.108 This concern may however 
be alleviated by developing regional securities markets across provincial boundaries. In 
history, similar efforts to develop regional financial markets can be observed in the evolution 
of the banking industry.109 However, it is still too early to tell whether the regional equity 
centres will follow the trajectory of the banking industry.  
 
In practice, the strong hand of the sole regulator CSRC has seriously limited the 
discretion of local governments in regulating local financial matters.110 However, to facilitate 
                                                   
106 On 30 March of 2009, the LFO of Beijing was renamed as the Finance Bureau, a governmental 
bureau level department, directly under the control of the local government. 
107 The first LFO was established in Shanghai in 2002. See Yonggang Liu and Hua Wei, ‘The 
History of Local Financial Office’ (2013) China Economic Weekly 23 at 26.  
108 This may give rise to “the provinces’ relative independence from the central government on the 
one hand, and being independent from each other on the other hand.” See Zheng, De Facto Federalism 
in China, (supra n 16) at 366. 
109 Historically, the nine branches set up by the PBOC across the country (Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Nanjing, Shenyang, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Xian, and Jinan) can be viewed as a forerunner of 
the regional financial markets in China. 
110 The history of the (so-called) Chinese OTC stock market is marked by two clean-up initiatives, 
which terminated all the non-stock exchange stock trading activities: see Caili Yang and Yiqun Cao, 
‘Review of the Development of China’s OTC Market in 1990s’, in Luan Gao and Guanhua Zhong (ed), 
Annual Report on China’s OTC Market Development 2009-2010 (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic 
Press 2009), 62-93, at 90. Despite the fact that Local Property Rights Centres filled the gap, it should 
be noted that it is not securities but the property rights (of SOEs in general) that are traded on LPTCs: 
see also Fengjun He, ‘The Game on the Allocation of Financial Resources between the Central 
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the development of a multi-tier capital market, regulatory authority may have to be 
delicately distributed between the CSRC and the local governments so that the local/regional 
securities markets may both provide additional financing sources to SMEs and secure the 
intended market stability and integrity. On the one hand, local governments may be better 
suited than a short-staffed CSRC to monitor the local situation. First, if local companies are 
the main candidate companies to be quoted on regional/local equity markets, local 
governments may have a better understanding of such companies and a stronger power to 
make and enforce local regulations.111 Second, if local governments have more opportunities 
to experiment with new policies, competition among local regulations may produce rules 
with better qualities in terms of market integrity and investor protection.112  
 
On the other hand, unconstrained discretion of local governments may also engender 
ill-effects undermining the stability of the whole securities market. Researchers have already 
demonstrated that it is the intervention from local governments at different levels that leads 
to widely observed abuses such as tunnelling, holding-back of cash dividends, distorted 
refinancing on the stock market and the malfunction of the delisting system.113 Also, a 
regulatory race to the bottom between local governments may still be a real serious concern, 
the gravity of which may be more precarious due to the almost homogenous financial 
structures of different provinces. 114  Again, this is another delicate balance the central 
                                                                                                                                                              
Government and Local Governments’ (2005) 11 Chongqing University Academic (Social Science 
Section) 42.  
111 This may also be beneficial to potential investors, who may have special knowledge of local 
business. 
112 Expressing this in terms of the theory of complex adaptive systems, chaos at local levels in this 
situation is beneficial to stability at higher levels. For the application of the CAS theories to financial 
market regulation, see Edoardo Gaffeo and Roberto Tamborini, ‘If the Financial System is Complex, 
How Can We Regulate It?’ (2011) 40 International Journal of Political Economy 79; William White, 
‘The Prudential Regulation of Financial Institutions: Why Regulatory Responses to the Crisis Might 
Not Prove Sufficient’ (2013) 6 University of Calgary The School of Public Policy Research Papers 1. 
For experimental rules in financial markets from the perspective of public choice theory, see Zachary 
Gubler, ‘Experimental Rules’, supra n 58. 
113 Local governments with a strong inclination to serve local interests may well tunnel assets of 
those limited number of listed companies, which seriously undermines the confidence of the investors 
on the market. In addition, the reason why it is hard to delist listed companies with ST status from the 
national stock exchanges is that the ultimate shareholder (local governments) of those ST companies 
may well take advantage of the current accounting rules to give ST companies a break; this is the 
notorious “phoenix nirvana” on the Chinese stock market. ST means special treatment. In China, when 
a listed company triggers one of several financial distress indicators its shares will be labelled “ST”. See 
Rule 13.1.4 of the Listing Rules of SHSE (2015) and Rule 13.1.3 and 13.1.4 SZSE (2015). 
114 Jie Zhang, ‘The Intervention of Local Governments and Mutation of the Financial System’, 
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regulator has to strike.  
 
That said, we must be cautious about the efficacy of regulatory experimentation in 
helping the central government to achieve the intended objective. It is true that the typical 
regulatory approach by exploration, evaluation and then extension has been employed 
successfully in history. However, the legitimacy and legality of such an approach are 
increasingly open to doubt. Indeed, due to the gradual movement towards a “rule of law” 
legal system in China, the uncertainty and the accompanying risks in law and politics 
inherent in the process of experimentation may well constrain the continuing adoption of a 
similar approach in the future.115 For one thing, innovation cannot easily be protected in law 
and so emulation by other provinces may well limit any “early mover” advantage. For another, 
the increasingly developed legal system may limit the discretion of local governments to 
innovate. 
 
The uncertainty surrounding the operation of the LEEs is evident in their lack of formal 
legal status. Since the relevant circulars are of an administrative nature, LEEs do not enjoy a 
legal status in law,116 which entails further clarification from the central government and 
ultimately in law. Given that Circular No.37 of the SCO and No.38 of the CSRC provide that 
the establishment and the operation of the LEEs fall within the competence of local 
governments, we may expect that the LFOs, with power delegated from the provincial 
government, will play an increasingly important role in coordinating different stakeholders, 
setting up LEEs, and even inculcating a favourable culture of equity financing for SMEs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1996) 3 Economic Research 21.  
115 See Gao and Zhong (ed), Annual Report, (supra n 110) at 89; Yongnian Zheng, De Facto 
Federalism in China – Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local Relations (Daolong Qiu tr, Beijing: 
The Oriental Press 2013) at 9-10. 
116 Article 7 of the Legislation Law of the PRC 2015 states that only The National People’s Congress 
and its Standing Committee have the legislative power of the State. Articles 65, 72 and 80 provide for 
the legislative power of the State Council, the people’s congresses or their standing committees of the 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. For the LEEs, there are no clear laws, regulations 
or rules to regulate them, thus we say that they do not enjoy formal legal status. The most relevant 
rules are the Provisional Rules on the Supervision and Administration of Local Equity Exchanges 
(Draft for Opinions). 
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4. Regulation of Issuing and Trading on LEEs 
Admittedly, the LEEs in China will be subject to less intense regulation than the national 
market because they are focused on providing finance to early-stage enterprises and SMEs 
rather than mature companies. However, regulation of the LEEs is still necessary mainly for 
two reasons: to control transaction costs and to mitigate or at least control the externalities 
arising from the operation of the markets.117 Due to the incipient stage of the LEEs, an 
immediate regulatory concern for local governments is how to lower transaction costs, which 
have “significant and dependable” implications on equity market volatility and in turn the 
survival of the LEEs.118 Moreover, the price discovery function of the LEEs should also be 
emphasized for the sustainable development of LEEs. Local regulators should accordingly be 
attentive to “the method by which prices are determined and the susceptibility of the 
price-setting process to abuse by dealers.”119 In terms of trading rules, the current rules are 
principles-based but with a restrictive nature.120 For instance, LEEs are prohibited under the 
Circular No.37 from adopting any centralized trading methods, including the call auction, 
continuous auction, electronic matching, anonymous trading and acting as a market maker. 
LEEs wishing to operate financial products, like insurance, credit or gold, must secure prior 
permissions from the relevant administrative departments.121  
 
Furthermore, several barriers in the current regulatory scheme may have to be removed 
before LEEs can play their due role in facilitating financing for local SMEs. One immediate 
concern is that the current law makes the public capital market almost an impossible 
alternative for SMEs. This is because most SMEs are not joint stock companies but limited 
liability companies (LLCs), which are not qualified for equity financing on the public capital 
market.122 Even if a SME has been converted from a limited liability company into a joint 
stock company, the current regulatory scheme on public offers may still frustrate SMEs from 
entering the public capital market. According to the current law, any offer to unspecified 
                                                   
117 See generally Jonathan R. Macey, and Maureen O'Hara, ’Regulating Exchanges and Alternative 
Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective’ (1999) 28 Journal of Legal Studies 17.  
118 Ibid.  
119 Christopher Green, Paolo Maggioni, Victor Murinde, ‘Regulatory Lessons for Emerging Stock 
Markets from a Century of Evidence on Transactions Costs and Share Price Volatility in the London 
Stock Exchange’ (2000) 24 J. Banking and Finance 577.  
120 This can be understood from the largely prohibitive stance of Circular 37 and Circular 38.  
121 See supra n 95.  
122 Only JSCs are qualified for listing and trading on stock exchanges: see Art 50 0f the Securities 
Law 2014.  
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investors or, in cases of issuing to specified investors the number of investors exceeds 200, 
will be deemed as a public offer requiring prior approval from the CSRC.123 In other words, a 
private placement which leads to the shareholders of a SME exceeding 200 will require prior 
approval from the CSRC. Since this approach drives LEEs to function as private placement 
markets only, SMEs are thus deprived of public financing.  
 
The second concern is about the registration and custody of shares to be transferred or 
newly issued on the LEEs. Registration falls within the remit of the local bureau of 
Administration of Industry and Commerce (LAICs) while custody is within the business 
scope of the LEE. A transfer of the shares completed on the LEE without a corresponding 
change to the articles of association at the LAIC is legally ineffective,124 a situation which 
may further undermine the legitimacy of the LEE at such an incipient stage. The overlap of 
the power between the intended function of LEE and the legally established power of the 
LAICs thus hinders share transfers on LEEs.  
 
The third concern is the trading system permitted on the LEEs. Pricing via individual 
negotiations between transaction parties is still the norm among LEEs. Although both 
TianJin EE and ChongQing EE introduced the competitive bid system and pricing via 
negotiations, TianJin EE is the only LEE which has introduced the market maker system.125 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of liquidity on most LEEs, the introduction of the market maker 
system will not make too much difference to the liquidity of the LEEs. 
 
                                                   
123 Securities Law 2014 Art 10 and SCGO [2006] Circular No.99 Notification on the Relevant 
Issues on the Strict Crackdown on Unlawful Issuance of Stocks and Unlawful Operation of Securities 
Business. 
124 Registration of a change to the shareholder list is required of LLCs (Art 32 of the Company Law 
2014) and JSCs (Art 139 of the Company Law 2014). In addition, the Regulations of the PRC on the 
Registration and Administration of Companies (2014) have clear rules for modification of registration. 
No company may, without authorization, change any registered items without going through the 
modification registration (Art 26, 34). Where a change is to be made to the list of shareholders filed for 
record at the AIC, the company shall apply for a change of registration within 30 days of such changes, 
and submit the capacity eligibility proof of the new shareholder or the identity proof of the natural 
person concerned. However, the law is not clear on whether it is the directors, the company or the legal 
representative who will bear the corresponding legal liabilities when the company fails to go through 
the relevant change registration.  
125 China OTC Market Report 
<http://file.chinascopefinancial.com/website/reports/chinascope_otc_report_201401_en.pdf> 
accessed 19 November 2015.   
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The fourth concern is that the lack of conversion rules between different tiers of the 
securities market may place the LEEs in a dilemma. For one thing, due to the low liquidity 
and the underperformance of LEEs, they may have to serve as seed pools of qualified SMEs 
which are to be converted to securities markets at higher levels if they are to have any useful 
role as conduits for equity financing. For another, given the current fervour and the strong 
performance of the New Third Board (NEEQ), qualified SMEs may select to be quoted 
directly on the New Third Board (NEEQ) without bothering to spend more money and time to 
be quoted and remain dormant on LEEs. Therefore, the lack of conversion rules between 
different tiers of the securities market only exacerbates the limited strategic options open to 
LEEs. 
 
Due to the underperformance of LEEs, policy innovations under the strong monitoring 
of the central regulator may not be easy. To a large extent, most innovations can only be 
termed as improved co-ordinations. Competition among local securities trading centres is 
thus more akin to competition among piano players rather than among innovative musical 
instrument makers. Given such a regulatory framework, collaboration among LEEs is a much 
better choice for local governments to retain their regulatory power over LEEs. For example, 
the LiaoNing Equity Exchange (LNEE) has already made investment into the Inner Mongolia 
EE and a coalition with Jilin and Heilongjiang Securities Trading Centres is also in progress. 
The central government however keeps an attentive eye on the development of local 
securities trading centres. 
 
5. Competition 
The objective of regulation of securities market service providers is to achieve a free 
market which does not inhibit competition. In the west, the evolution of a multi-tier securities 
market is partly a result of natural evolution, which promotes competition among different 
service providers, exchanges, brokers-dealers, and other trading systems. 126  While such 
competition has sometimes been thwarted by restrictive practices, the MiFID regime in the 
EU, for instance, has opened up competition between established exchanges and alternative 
                                                   
126 In the UK, provincial stock exchanges were set up to compete with the then London Stock 
Exchange and when that failed to supplement the transactions on the London Stock Exchanges. 
Provincial stock exchanges in the UK were almost all occupied with local government debts and 
functioned as extension of the London Stock Exchanges. See Leyshon et. al., The Rise of the British 
Provincial Financial Center, supra n 88. 
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trading venues in recent years.127  
 
However, competition among different service providers so as to engender a sustainable 
securities market has not yet become a reality in China. It should be noted that Circulars 
No.37 and No.38128 may intentionally place the LEEs outside the public equity market.129 A 
detailed reading of the two Circulars tells us that the central government intends to develop 
the multi-tier securities market in sequence. Indeed, despite the juxtaposition of both debt 
financing and equity financing in the circulars with regard to their function, the LEEs are 
designed (and also as iteratively emphasized by the governor of the CSRC130) mainly as 
markets for debt products, which intentionally marginalizes their equity funding function. In 
addition, the current law strictly prohibits public offering of shares on the LEEs despite the 
recent promulgation of rules on public offering of non-listed shares by the CSRC.131 In other 
words, the strong central control administratively constrains the development of the LEEs, 
especially in their role as conduits for equity financing.  
 
Accordingly, the reality is that the multi-tier capital market is being built within China 
with a clear intention to prioritize the national systems, including both national stock 
exchanges and the national New Third Board (NEEQ). LEEs are intentionally frustrated by 
                                                   
127 See further G Ferrarini and P Saguato, Regulating Financial Market Infrastructures, chapter 19 
in N Moloney, E Ferran and J Payne (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP, 
2015).   
128 See supra n 95.   
129 The private placement function of the LEEs has also been clarified in the Draft for Consultation 
by the CSRC in June 2015. 
130 While there is no clear roadmap for the development of local securities trading centers, the 
Chairman of the CSRC expressed in one meeting after his intensive investigation of three equity 
trading centers the vision of how to develop local securities trading centers:  
“local equity trading markets are markets for non-publically issued shares, which are 
administered by local governments. The business scope of such markets shall focus on local 
enterprises, products shall center around further financing through credit enhancement and 
M&A transactions while at the same time gradually improve equity financing. The itinerary 
for the evolution of local equity markets shall not follow the old track of national securities 
exchanges. The pursuance of the number of listed cases and the activeness of equity trading 
are not the targets of these trading centers.”  
See Baochen Zhu and Xiao Gang, ‘Drawing the Itinerary for the Reformation of Chinese Capital 
Market from Multiple Perspectives’, Securities Daily, 24 Dec 2014, available at 
<http://www.ccstock.cn/stock/gupiaoyaowen/2014-12-24/A1419356673282.html> accessed 19 
November 2015 
131 See CSRC, Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Non-Listed Public Companies 
(2012, revised 2013) 
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the central regulator from playing their due role of facilitating equity financing for SMEs in 
the multi-tier capital market. The dominant position of the national system is accordingly an 
outgrowth of a carefully designed evolution supported by the central government and the 
CSRC rather than that of a natural evolution process.   
 
The intentional segregation between the national market and the local markets and 
between different local markets (according to administrative boundaries) may in fact 
preclude competition among different service providers. Indeed, the rather dim and opaque 
picture of LEEs is in stark contrast with the bright and highlighted New Third Board (NEEQ). 
Local securities markets are on the agenda of the central regulator but are subordinated to 
the needs of the national market. Viewed from that perspective, the quota of one LEE for each 
province may better be deemed as a political compromise from the central government to 
cater for the local governments. It is possible that the failure of exploration of LEEs in some 
provinces may have already been taken into consideration when the central regulator issued 
the two circulars constraining the development of LEEs. 
 
In reality, competition among LEEs is not a serious concern as the companies to be 
quoted on LEEs are mainly local SMEs and potential investors will be either local investors or 
else investors who are familiar with those applicant companies. Such a regulatory approach 
adopted by the central regulator may help economically less developed provinces to retain 
those qualified local SMEs on the LEE without seeking finance from another active LEE 
outside the province. Even though such an approach may cater for the impulse of local 
governments to develop their own Equity Exchanges, it conflicts with the fundamental 
function of the capital market in terms of efficiently distributing financial sources. In addition, 
local provincial governments may have to design favourable rules in alignment with the 
performance of local applicants and the investment preference of local investors. As a result, 
a market for lemons may have little chance to develop into a more efficient market with 
broader appeal to issuers and investors.  
 
That said, competition among provincial governments can still be observed but to serve a 
purpose to secure favourable policies from the central government, which further strengthens 
the strong position of the central government in its negotiation with local governments. 
Reference to the independent governance model of TianJin EE can help us better understand 
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this issue.132 Compared with governance models of the other LEEs, TianJin EE enjoys more 
independence in terms of trading rules and less intervention from the CSRC. This model 
however was approved by the SC as early as 2009.133 Given the earlier development of the 
TianJin EE in comparison with the other LEEs, Tianjin apparently enjoyed the advantage of a 
head start by securing favourable policies from the central regulator.  
 
In comparison, the major concern for LEEs is the competition from the New Third Board 
(NEEQ), where SMEs can access a bigger and better-informed pool of investors and can be 
easily converted to the main board of the national exchanges. In addition, compared with the 
much larger subsidy provided by local governments to each candidate company to be quoted 
on the New Third Board, the one-off small subsidy granted to the LEEs may better be deemed 
as a courtesy service by the local governments – to ignite the interest of other players in the 
local securities market.134 In combination, the shortage of conversion rules, the limitation 
imposed on the products and applicants on the LEEs and the meagre subsidy provided by the 
local governments may in fact make the LEEs superfluous in terms of facilitating equity 
financing for SMEs.135 Blue chip SMEs will seek financing directly on the New Third Board 
(NEEQ) without bothering to stay dormant on the LEEs. The shortage of such rules unfairly 
disadvantages LEEs on the public capital market. In the words of our interviewees: “There is 
little chance that local teams can win a game with the national team.”  
 
The upshot is that the options available to applicant companies and potential investors 
                                                   
132 Jianrong Jiang, Gang Zeng, Kangning Qian, Fang Gong, and Bei Liu, ‘The Regulation of 
Quotation, Financing, Transfer, and Registration of the Regional OTC market and The Measures of the 
Stock Exchanges to Support the Development of the Regional Equity Exchange’ (2013) a co-sponsored 
project by Shanghai Stock Exchange and Institution of the Shenyin Wanguo Securities Companies, 
SSE Assembly Report 
No.24 ,http://2015.sse.com.cn/researchpublications/jointresearch/c/c_20140414_3790771.pdf., 
accessed 19 November 2015 
133 The State Council issued the Reply to the Framework Measures on the Exploration of the 
Comprehensive Complementary Reform of the BinHai New Zone of Tianjin, which was further 
implemented by The Specific Plan for the Exploration of Financial Innovation in the Comprehensive 
and Complementary Reform of the BinHai New Zone of Tianjin issued by the Tianjin Government. 
134 See infra Section E. 
135 The standard itinerary for a company to be listed is typically as follows. Once a company issues 
shares to the public, they will first be listed on OTC markets. They might then move to a regional 
exchange. And most would convert to the formal exchanges, selected according to the stringency of the 
listing requirements of those markets. See Michael Simon and Robert Colby, ’The National Market 
System for Over-the-Counter Stocks‘ (1986-7) 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 17, at 21-22. 
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are not different national trading systems in competition but rather an intentionally designed 
multi-tier securities markets with each tier of the capital market serving companies from 
different administrative localities. Such a regulatory intention may suit the existing 
administrative hierarchy, where local governments compete for favours from the central 
government. Among and between LEEs, we can observe an intensification of lobbying efforts 
by local officials who strive to obtain official “experimental point” status136 to gain access to 
central preferential treatment and to improve their career prospects, just like the TianJin EE 
which enjoys the advantage of a head start. The ambition to develop a multi-tier capital 
market so as to serve companies with different financial needs has thus been subordinated to 
the constraints of the existing administrative framework.  
 
Given that market participants have few markets to select from and that the availability 
of securities market institutions is strictly under control of the central government, market 
participants may find it hard to avoid or sidestep the cumbersome regulations by directing 
the trade to less or non-regulated securities markets. The regulatory scheme of LEEs is 
framed neither to adapt to the “different services designed to respond to the needs of 
different clientele”137 nor to “serve public policy goals of promoting fairness and efficiency 
without restricting the ability of market participants to offer precisely the bundle of products 
that they choose to offer their respective clientele and no more.”138 The ultimate results 
however are markets without investors.  
 
E. MARKETS WITHOUT INVESTORS – TWO CASE STUDIES  
1. Context and Methodology  
To understand the institutional setup process for LEEs, we undertook personal 
interviews with diverse market participants, such as regulators, intermediaries and investors 
connected with the two LEEs in LiaoNing province.139 The interviews helped us to fill gaps in 
the public information relating to the LEEs as well as to clarify the dynamics of their 
                                                   
136 See Heilmann, ‘Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise’ (supra n 70), at 10. 
137 See Macey, and O'Hara, ‘Regulating Exchanges and ATS’ (supra n 117) at 54.  
138 Ibid.  
139 Semi-structured interviews were conducted subject to the condition that observations could be 
reported but not attributed. We employed both in-person interviews and interviews by telephone, the 
latter mainly for follow-up questions.  
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operation and regulation. In order to integrate the interview results with the 
experimentation theory introduced in Parts A and B we differentiate experimentation at 
three different levels, each of which has a bearing on the manner in which the LEE form of 
experimentation is framed and executed.     
 
1. Experimentation at national level: the ultimate objective of experimentation 
is to achieve a healthy national securities market. Experimentation at this level is 
conducted to determine an appropriate structure for China's securities market by 
creating different levels and setting an appropriate relationship between them. 
For that purpose, the results of experimentations at lower levels, for instance the 
failure of the regional trading centres, could result in overall success for the 
experiment at the national level. In more specific terms this approach could lead 
to the conclusion that only the New Third Board is required and that the LEE 
experiment may be ended.    
 
2. Experimentation at the intermediary level: intermediary experimentation is 
conducted to set the correct parameters for over-lapping regulations between the 
CSRC (intermediary regulation) and provincial governments (local exchanges).140 
This issue is, however, complicated by the absence in China of a conventional 
regulatory perimeter, which means in effect that all activities conducted on and all 
products introduced to the securities market require prior approvals to limit risk 
prima facie from provincial governments but ultimately from the central 
government. This makes the concept of policy innovation very tricky because it is 
a government controlled process rather than spontaneous development in 
response to market signals.141 However, this just echoes what Polanyi argued 
                                                   
140 In addition to provinces, this concept also covers those four cities under the direct control of 
the central government (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing). All these administrative units are 
at provincial level in the administrative hierarchy of the PRC. 
141 One of the interviewees referred to "innovation under the norms". 
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decades ago that the shadow of the state is present even without formal 
regulation.142  
 
3. Experimentation at local levels or more specifically explorations to set 
disclosure and corporate governance rules on the Local Equity Exchanges (LEEs). 
It is this form of experimentation which has the largest private input from 
stakeholders in the LEEs (as well as some high-level input from the provincial 
governments). There appears to be a strong self-regulatory element in this process 
(e.g. model articles for candidate companies developed by the LEEs) while local 
governments also have incentives to facilitate share transfer by providing local 
regulations within the existing boundary of laws and state regulations. 
 
Experimentation across these three dimensions must, however, be understood within 
the specific context of the overarching regime of financial regulation in China. The nature of 
state control in China (both indirectly through state shareholding by the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) at different levels and the 
Nomenklatura system; and directly through regulations) means that there is no direct 
counterpart of the western concept of the “regulatory perimeter”. Thus, the concept that 
individuals, transactions and markets may be located beyond the oversight and control of the 
government and its administrative agencies is simply alien to the existing Chinese system.143  
 
A consistent observation from our interviewees was that even in the absence of any legal 
or regulatory prohibition any action in the form of financial innovation could be subject to ex 
post intervention by the government in the form of regulation or even prohibition. In that 
sense, there can be no direct counterpart in China to the OTC market in the west since the 
OTC market relies on a clear demarcation between regulated activity and unregulated 
                                                   
142 See Polanyi, The Great Transformation (supra n 21). 
143 See infra Section D 1.  
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activity.144 Thus, innovations in the Chinese context must be understood as a process that is 
driven more by testing and extending official tolerance for new techniques rather than the 
process of competitive evolution that is envisaged in western systems. Alternatively, 
economic agents will also be frustrated by the regulatory norms in the sense that the 
applicability of the general rule that actions not prohibited by law are permitted will be 
seriously constrained by the regulatory norm of ex post review. In turn, economic agents in 
less developed provinces may be further handicapped in promoting financial innovation in 
comparison with their counterparties in economically developed provinces, who may have 
more bargaining chips to negotiate with the central government to mitigate unintended 
ill-effects arising from the ex post reviews.  
  
2. Government Involvement 
Following the establishment of LEEs in Shanghai and Zhejiang in 2013, LiaoNing Equity 
Exchange (LNEE) and DaLian EE (DLEE) were established in sequence in the same year. 
While both the national stock exchanges and the LEEs were established as joint stock 
companies, they are neither independent companies with their own interests to pursue nor 
mutual exchanges, which are of and for their members.145 The following characteristics 
demonstrate that the operation of the LEEs are under the strict monitoring of the CSRC, 
especially in terms of the intended function of providing equity financing for SMEs. 
 
Both the LNEE and DLEE were established to play both a governmental/ administrative 
role of developing the local securities market and a profit-seeking role for their own 
sustainability. The dual objectives imply intensive involvement on the part of the local 
                                                   
144 That remains so even if it is conceded that the regulatory system may at times reach into the 
OTC market, for example through intermediary regulation or rules relating to trade reporting. See 
further text at supra n 45 referencing the definition of the OTC market in China.    
145 Jingyun Ma, Fengming Song and Zhishu Yang, ‘The Dual Role of the Government: Securities 
Market Regulation in China 1980-2007’ (2010) 18 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 
158, at 162-4. 
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governments. Both the LNFO and DLFO played an important coordination role among 
different authorities in the development of the local EEs. They also helped to introduce funds 
for market development (e.g., governmental guiding fund and afterwards perfection funds) 
and funds for investor protection (the latter requires pro rata contribution of promoters).146 
The LiaoNing government provided a one-off fiscal subsidy of 5m RMB for qualified LLCs to 
be converted into JSCs.147 A similar sized one-off subsidy was also provided by the DaLian 
municipal government. However, this sum of money may only be sufficient to pay for the 
intermediary fees for 20-30 necessary conversions.  
 
While both EEs in LiaoNing were set up in 2013, the DLEE has proven to be 
unsuccessful with the operation almost coming to a stop. The DLEE is now merely a separate 
office with an independent logo. A group of staff from the Dalian Property Rights Trading 
Centre now operate the DLEE. Even though the government of Dalian devoted extensive and 
intensive efforts into the development of the DLEE, the result is unsatisfactory with liquidity 
and trading volume being lower compared with the LNEE.  
 
For both the LNEE and the DLEE, local government involvement is necessary for other 
reasons. Interviewees repeatedly mentioned that the environment of the local financial 
market is not favourable for developing a public securities market. It is widely understood 
that people from North Eastern China are conservative and reluctant to make deals. In 
comparison, people from JiangSu and ZheJiang (adjacent to Shanghai) areas are much more 
oriented towards commerce. The awareness of the local governments of the function of the 
securities markets is therefore of special importance in the North Eastern area to provide 
favourable rules on evaluation criteria regarding qualified companies. Second, the lack of a 
credit rating system also inhibits the development of LEEs. It is known that the credit rating 
system for individuals is still under construction whereas that for enterprises has not yet 
                                                   
146 Information secured from our interviews. 
147 The subsidy from Liaoning was provided for qualified limited liability companies in seven cities 
within the province. No subsidies are now available for enterprises to be listed on the LNEE although 
micro and agricultural enterprises may still access such subsidies. 
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been put on the table at either national or local level. This is a serious concern for the 
enterprises providing guarantees associated with the listing of securities (especially 
securitized debt) on the LEEs. In the absence of credible private sector credit rating agencies, 
the involvement of local governments is crucial to build norms and enhance the creditability 
of transactions conducted on the LEEs. 
 
3. Shareholders 
Despite the intensive monitoring of the financial office of the local government, the 
operation of the LEEs has largely been placed in the hands of the shareholders of the EE. For 
the LNEE, the nature of the shareholders indicates that the governance of the LNEE can be 
viewed as a government dominated model. The LNEE was set up as a joint stock company 
with five shareholders. 148  The two large shareholders play an important role in the 
governance of the LNEE. Cinda controls almost all the staffing of the LNEE, except for the 
vice CEO, which was dispatched by the SHSE and approved by the LNFO. The other 
blockholder (Shenyang Equity Registration and Custody LLC) represents the LiaoNing 
provincial government. In combination, the SASACs of LiaoNing, Dalian and ShenYang 
control 47% of the LNEE. Moreover, since the securities companies are all under close 
monitoring of the CSRC, it also has an important say in the control of the LNEE. Such a 
shareholding structure may better be deemed as a balance reached between the central 
regulator and the local government in the case of LNEE.   
 
For the DLEE, we observe a largely similar picture. However, in comparison with the 20% 
shareholding of the SHSE in the LNEE, the SZSE only controls 5% of the DLEE.149 DaLian 
                                                   
148 Cinda Venture Capital Investment LLC, which is a subsidiary of Cinda Securities Company 
(33%); Datong Securities Investment Co. (10%), of which the DaLian SASAC is the supermajority 
shareholder; Zhongtian Securities Investment Co (4%), of which LiaoNing SASAC is the 88% 
shareholder; SHSE Information and Network LLC (20%), which is a subsidiary of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange; and Shenyang Equity Registration and Custody LLC (33%), which is a subsidiary of 
Shenyang United Property Right Exchange. 
149 There is no clear indication why the two exchanges followed different investment policies. A 
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municipal government itself ultimately controls almost 95% of the DLEE as DaLian SASAC 
either controls or dominates the shareholding of the other four shareholders apart from the 
SZSE. The predominant shareholding by the DaLian municipal government may indicate 
that a more intensive impetus of the local government to develop its own local securities 
market, which may partly be attributed to the benefits DaLian has been enjoying from the 
DaLian Commodity Exchange and the ambition of DaLian to compete, especially with the LN 
provincial government, for the financial centre of North East China. However, the 
disproportionate dominance of the local government may also place the DLEE into a 
dangerous situation due to the lack of external expertise. In fact, the precarious financial 
situation of the DLEE may have already seriously dampened the initial fervour of the DaLian 
government.  
 
Due to the close relationship between the CSRC and the two national Stock Exchanges, 
and the close monitoring of the investment activities of the securities companies investing in 
LEEs,150 the birth and operation of the LEEs can be viewed as the result of coordination 
between the CSRC and the local governments, with the former playing a more important role 
especially in developing the local equity markets. Even though it is the shareholders who 
design the first set of rules, it is still safe to say that these rules are also constrained by the 
CSRC, which closely monitors the operation of securities trading companies and their 
involvement in LEEs. The institutional control on the securities market by the central 
authority is also apparent from several other perspectives. First, approval of the new trading 
venues, including LEEs, and new products to be traded on such markets, can only be secured 
from the State Council, or more specifically, the Joint-Conference of Ministries in which the 
                                                                                                                                                              
possible explanation is that the two exchanges do not want to lose in the competition for the shares of 
local markets. It is also noticeable that SHSE only made investment in three LEEs, i.e., ShangHai EE, 
ZheJiang EE, and LNEE, all with 20% shareholding. In comparison, SZSE made investment in 10 
LEEs, with shareholding diverging from 4.16% to 15% in each LEE: specifically; Beijing and 
ChongQing 15%; ChengDu and WuHan 10%; QianHai 9.52%; QiLu 6%; DaLian, GuangDong and 
QingHai 5%; ShanXi 4.16%. 
150 CSRC Announcement [2012] No.20, Guiding Opinions on Regulating the Involvement of 
Securities Companies in Regional Equity Trading Markets (provisional), 23 August 2012.  
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CSRC plays a dominant role. Second, it is true that the implications of the Nomenclature 
system on the staffing of the LEEs are not apparent in our project. However, given the dual 
objectives of LEEs and the intensive participation in approving the board members by the 
LFO in their incipient stage, the shadow of the Nomenclature system still hangs over the 
operation of LEEs.  
 
Such intensive involvement of the governments thus implants a gene of public interest 
into the LEEs. However, shareholders ultimately have to decide how to improve the 
performance of LEEs given the continuing underperformance of the LNEE and DLEE. 
Indeed, our interviewees expressed serious concerns that the majority shareholders of both 
EEs are increasingly losing interest in supporting the development of LEEs as the continuing 
underperformance only entails burning the deep pocket of the shareholders of the LEEs to 
achieve a public interest of the local governments, an objective which does not serve the 
commercial interests of the shareholders.151 
 
4. Regulatory Control of Membership 
Licensed membership has been widely used on exchanges as a means to control the type 
of business that can be conducted and the nature of competition between members. We 
discuss types of licensed memberships available on the exchanges, qualified candidates for 
such memberships, the business scope of each different type of licensed membership and the 
requirement of the registered capital for different types of members. As membership is 
closely linked with the business scope of the license accorded, we discuss them together. In 
addition, given the importance of securities companies on exchanges, we discuss the 
business scope of securities companies on LEEs separately. We conclude the section with a 
discussion of relevant capital requirements for membership. 
 
                                                   
151 Even though most shareholders are owned by local governments, they are independent legal 
persons with their own sustenance as the major concern. 
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In order to facilitate our discussion we compare the types of membership available on 
the LEEs by comparison those on the national New Third Board (NEEQ). This serves the 
purpose of clarifying the nature of the experimentation that is taking place on the LEEs and 
the manner in which they fit into a segmented national securities market. We find that 
experimentation is taking place at all three of the levels mentioned earlier (national, 
intermediary and local). While the scope for experimentation at the local level is explicitly 
constrained within the segmented national securities market, we observe that there are 
ownership, regulatory and operational differences between the two LEEs in LiaoNing 
province that may help to explain their evolution and viability.  
  
a) Types, Candidates and Business Scope of Memberships 
Both the LNEE and the DLEE separate their members into three categories: members 
who are entitled to recommend companies to be quoted; members who can only provide 
professional services; and members who only enjoy the status of Strategic Co-operator. In 
terms of qualifications for recommendation members, both the LNEE and the DLEE 
introduce financial performance and relevant experience as relevant thresholds. However, 
the LNEE further expressly identifies that accounting firms, law firms and even industrial 
analysts, who are not allowed to deal with securities transactions according to the Securities 
Law 2014, can be candidates for recommendation members on the LNEE.152 In terms of 
professional member, the LNEE may accredit a larger group of professionals to be 
professional members by merely requiring of such firms a good reputation and business 
performance. In comparison, the DLEE prescribes a much stricter set of qualifications. There 
are no stipulations on strategic co-operator members on the DLEE whereas the LNEE 
stipulates that as long as a partner has a sound internal control system, with specialists and 
good information technology, and importantly the capacity for financial innovation, a 
partner can be a potential candidate for  strategic co-operator membership on the LNEE.  
                                                   
152 Securities Law of the PRC 2014 Art 171 and The Rules of the LiaoNing Equity Exchange 
Membership Management 2013 (Trial) Article 8 
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As shown in Table 2, the LNEE provides more choices than the DLEE. Such “innovation” 
may accordingly help to access a broader range of stakeholders to participate in the 
development of the LNEE. Our interviews show that members on the LNEE also enjoy 
important regulatory powers. The review committee153 set up by selected members of the 
LNEE enjoys a decisive power in terms of deciding whether an application for quotation is 
successful, and of reviewing any revision made to the existing rules though the revision must 
approved by the LNFO before they come into effect. In the light of the moribund situation of 
the DLEE it is not possible to compare the role of members in the operation of the DLEE.  
 
We provide the following tables for the sake of clarity. 
 
Table 2: Membership on LNEE and DLEE 
                                                   
153 An organ corresponding to the Review Committee of Issuance of the CSRC. 
 
LNEE DLEE 
Categories of 
Membership 
1. Member for recommendation 
2. Member for professional 
services 
3. Others (Member for Strategic 
Cooperation; Special Member) 
1. Member for recommendation 
2. Member for professional 
services 
General 
Requirements 
1. No violation of laws within 12 
months 
2. Good reputation and business 
performance 
3. Compliance with rules and 
regulations of the equity 
exchange 
1. No violation of laws within 3 
years 
2. Good reputation and business 
performance 
3. Compliance with rules and 
regulations of the equity 
exchange 
Special 
Requirements 
for 
Recommendat
ion Member 
1. Should be securities company, 
or other approved financial 
institutions , qualified 
accounting firm or  law firm 
2. No reserved/negative opinions 
1. No reserved/negative opinions 
within the latest (or current 
annual) financial statement  
2. Relevant experience in 
quoting, investment 
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By way of comparison, the New Third Board (NEEQ) has its own list of qualified 
members for intermediaries, including 88 nominated brokers and advisers (securities 
companies), 39 accounting firms and 412 law firms.154 The relevant rules155 list three types 
of business licenses for nominated securities companies to apply: license of recommendation 
business, brokerage business and market maker. In addition, the New Third Board (NEEQ) 
also issues licenses to securities companies which provide brokerage and market making 
                                                   
154 Data drawn from the New Third Board (NEEQ) website, 
<http://bpmweb.neeq.org.cn/xxpl/web/securityList.infor> accessed 19 November 2015.  
155 Article 4 of the Rules of the National Equities Exchange and Quotations for the Sponsoring 
Brokers Management (Trial).  
within the latest (or current 
annual) financial statement  
3. Relevant experience in quoting, 
investment counselling and due 
diligence 
4. Specialists in accounting, law, 
and securities  analysis 
counselling and due diligence 
 
Special 
Requirements 
for 
Professional 
Services 
Members 
1. Qualified accounting firm and 
law firm with good reputations 
and business performance 
1. Operating more than 5 years 
2. ≥ 10 professionals with 
qualification 
3. Relevant experience in 
quoting, investment 
counselling and due diligence 
4. Good organizational structure 
and sound internal control 
system 
Special 
Requirements 
for Members: 
Strategic 
Co-operator 
and Others 
1. Sound internal control system 
2. Having specialists and good 
information technology 
3. Having financial innovation 
ability 
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services whereas the LEEs issue licenses for special membership or strategic partners.156 
And the New Third Board (NEEQ) makes specific provisions to regulate the securities 
companies’ conduct.157 There are however no rules on what kind of business accounting 
firms and law firms can run on the New Third Board (NEEQ), though these intermediaries 
are subject to the general rules of the Securities Law, which does not allow them to do what 
nominated brokers can do.158  
 
The members licensed on LEEs are different. While securities companies, investment 
management companies, accounting firms and law firms are all permitted to apply for 
licenses for recommendation business, licenses for professional services are only for 
accounting firms, law firms and asset appraisal institutions, most of which are experienced 
players on the public capital market. Trust companies, small loan companies, financing 
guarantee companies and other banking institutions, which cannot perform in other tiers of 
the securities market, can run all kinds of business with their licence as special members 
except for recommending quoted companies.159 This situation may partly be attributed to 
the lack of confidence of the LEEs in the services provided by the latter group especially in 
terms of sponsoring business. 
 
In common with the New Third Board, the LEEs also issue recommendation licenses 
and professional service licenses.160 Members holding recommendation licenses can only 
recommend applicants on the New Third Board, but their counterparts on the LNEE can also 
                                                   
156 The Rule of National Equities Exchange Quotations Business Management (Trial) 3.1.4; The 
Rule of National Equities Exchange Quotations Nominated Broker Management (Trial) Article 4 and 7; 
The Rules of the LiaoNing Equity Exchange Membership Management (Trial) Article 4, 7 and 10. No 
rules on special membership or strategic partners can be found in The Rule of DaLian Equity Exchange 
Quoting Business (Trial). 
157 The Rule of National Equities Exchange Quotations Nominated Broker Management (Trial) 
Article 2 (requirement of file for record so as to be Nominated Broker) and 4 (Business Scope by the 
Nominated Broker), the New Third Board (NEEQ) Rules on Business (Trial) Art 1.6 (the obligation of 
continuing supervision by the Nominated Broker) 
158 Securities Law of the PRC 2014 Article 171.  
159 The Rules of the LiaoNing Equity Exchange Membership Management 2013 (Trial) Article 7 
160 This leaves out the market making license. 
 48 
provide other services, such as participating in equity transfer, private placement of bonds, 
debenture financing and providing investment consultation services. The LNEE expressly 
requires that recommendation by a recommendation member is necessary in application for 
quotation,161 while the DLEE only requests the applicants to discuss with recommendation 
members before they start the process of quotation.162 It is worth noting that, in addition to 
the requirement of recommendation by a licensed recommendation member,163 the New 
Third Board (NEEQ) also requires continuous supervision of the nominated broker.164  The 
absence of such an agreement with sponsors or the nominated broker for candidate 
companies to be listed on LNEE and DLEE may expose these two LEEs to substanital risks of 
governance practices especially in terms of continuing governance practices after the 
quotation. 
 
Table 3: Qualified Companies Serving as Members 
and Their Business Scope on the LNEE and DLEE 
 
 
Recommendation Professional 
Others (Only in LNEE) 
Strategic Special 
LNEE DLEE LNEE DLEE   
Type of 
Companies 
Securities 
Companies, 
Qualified 
accounting 
firms and law 
firms 
Investment 
organizations 
Banks; 
Securities 
Companies; 
Accounting 
firms, 
Law firms, 
Asset evaluation 
firms 
Accounting 
firms,  
Law firms,  
Asset 
evaluation 
firms 
Trust 
companies, 
Banking 
financial 
institutions 
Financing 
guarantee 
companies, 
Small loan 
companies 
                                                   
161 Rules of The LiaoNing Equity Exchange Quoting Business 2014 (Trial) Article 2.   
162 Rules of The DaLian Equity Exchange Quoting Business 2014 (Trial) Article 2. 
163 Rules of The National Equities Exchange Quotations Business Management 2013 (Trial) 2.1.  
164 Rules of The National Equities Exchange Quotations Business Management 2013 (Trial) 1.6.  
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Business 
Scope 
Recommending, 
Equity 
financing,  
Equity 
quotation, 
Brokerage 
(purchasing and 
selling for 
clients), 
Private 
placement of 
bonds, 
Investment 
consulting 
Recommending, 
Private 
Placement of 
Equities, 
Private 
Placement of 
Bonds, 
Pledge of equity 
for financing 
Recommending, 
Private 
placement of 
bonds,  
Equity 
financing, 
Legal service, 
Auditing, 
Asset evaluation 
Accounting, 
Legal 
service, 
Asset 
evaluation 
Equity quotation, 
Private placement of 
bonds, 
Brokerage,(purchasing 
and selling for clients) 
Private  Placement of 
Equities, 
Investment consulting 
 
In comparison with the rules of the New Third Board (NEEQ), which clearly 
differentiate the different business scopes for each type of licenses, the rules of the LEEs are 
not clear cut. For example, the LNEE’s rules of membership management allow the special 
members to participate in equity transfer, private placement of bonds, debenture financing 
and providing investment consultation services when opportunities mature in the future. In 
effect, there is a possibility that all members on the LEEs may have a similar business scope 
in the future.  
 
Overall, by comparison with the rules on the New Third Board, the rules on members 
and their business scope on the two LEEs are rather ambiguous. This ambiguity may reflect 
the incipient stage of the evolution of these two LEEs, which are struggling to strike a 
balance between attracting the attention of institutional players and safeguarding a 
transparent and liquid local securities market. When we examine the two LEEs in detail, we 
find that the rules of the LNEE are more in alignment with the New Third Board regulatory 
framework, which has been accepted by the CSRC. This comparative proximity may give the 
LNEE a head start in its ensuing evolution.  
 
 50 
b) Business Scope of Securities Companies 
The overall business scope of securities companies under the Securities Law 2014 
covers seven different activities including an open-ended category of “any other business 
operation concerning securities”.165 As shown in table 4 below securities firms have a 
broader role at the two lower tiers by comparison with the national market. This approach 
evolved from the CSRC’s 2012 statement setting out how securities companies may 
participate in LEEs.166 First and foremost, the securities companies should evaluate the LEE 
and file a report before participating. Then, the securities companies can negotiate with the 
LEE about the way they participate. In addition to the standard business such as 
recommending companies to be quoted, brokerage business, bond financing, and equity 
financing, the CSRC also allows the securities companies to invest in LEEs. 
 
Table 4: Business Scope of Securities Companies 
 
SHSE and 
SZSE 
The New Third 
Board (NEEQ) 
LNEE DLEE 
Recommendation √ √ √ √ 
Brokerage business √ √ √ √ 
Securities business on  
its own account 
√    
Securities  
underwriting business 
√ √ √ √ 
Market maker  √   
Equity financing   √ √ 
Investment consulting   √ √ 
Investing in the    √ √ 
                                                   
165 Securities Law Article 125 (see infra n 171 below for more detail).  
166 CSRC Circular No. 20 [2012] Guiding Opinions on Regulating Securities Companies' 
Participation in Regional Equity Trading Markets (for Trial Implementation).  
 51 
equity exchange centre 
 
An interesting question is whether securities companies can function as market makers 
on different tiers of the multi-tier capital market. Market making business is now only 
permitted on the New Third Board (NEEQ) and TianJin EE. The case for market-making as 
a form of trade execution is that it can help quoted companies raise their reputation, 
promote stock liquidity, and improve the transparency of the equity market.167 Indeed, the 
market makers on the New Third Board (NEEQ) have already contributed to the recent 
strong performance on the New Third Board (NEEQ). 168 However, it remains unclear 
whether market making is permitted on the other LEEs. 
 
c) Registered Capital  
The Securities Law 2014 provides that prior approval from the CSRC must be given for 
any securities company to come into existence.169 It also regulates securities companies 
according to their business scope: a securities company must acquire prior approval from the 
CSRC for its intended business scope before it can start its activities.170 There are seven 
categories of businesses of securities companies: brokerage, investment consultation, 
financial consultation related to securities transactions, underwriting and sponsoring, 
securities business for its own account and securities asset management business and 
others. 171  Different sizes of registered capital are required for different businesses or 
different combination of businesses.172 In cases of expansion of businesses scope, no more 
                                                   
167 See generally Frank J. Fabozzi and Franco Modigliani, Capital Markets: Institutions and 
Instruments (4th edn, N. J.: Person Prentice Hall 2009); Zirui Lv, ‘Analysis of the Civil Laws on the 
Market Maker’ (2012) 33 Northern Legal Science 151. 
168 Chen Xia, ‘Marker makers to add much needed liquidity to NEEQ’, Global Times (China, 
August 24, 2014) <www.globaltimes.cn/content/877820.shtml> , (accessed 2 June, 2015).  
169 Securities Law 2014 Art 122. 
170 CSRC Announcement No. 42 [2008] Interim Provisions on the Examination and Approval of 
the Business Scope of Securities Companies  
171 Securities Law 2014 Art 125. 
172 Securities Law 2014 Art 127. 
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than two categories of businesses can be applied for in one application. In addition, on the 
basis of evaluation in terms of six indicators173, securities companies are also classified into 
11 different levels ranging from A to E.174 The results of classification however are not 
accessible to the public but available to the CSRC for the purpose of monitoring and to the 
China Securities Investor Protection Fund Company for the purpose of setting contributions 
to its investor protection fund. However, no reference to such classification has been made 
for securities companies intending to operate on LEEs. Since the law has already provided 
mandatory requirements for securities companies,175 The New Third Board (NEEQ) doesn’t 
request additional registered capital. But for securities companies that intend to be market 
makers, they need to provide additional financial documents for approval from the New 
Third Board (NEEQ).176  
 
Since there are no uniform regulations for LEEs, each LEE may design requirements for 
the registered capital on the basis of the quality of securities companies in their region. In 
general, the minimum net asset requirement of a recommendation member is 10 million 
RMB, a number much lower than that for securities companies according to the Securities 
Law 2014.177  
 
                                                   
173 Capital adequacy, corporate governance, regulatory compliance management, dynamic risk 
control, information system safety, protection of the interests of the clients, and information 
disclosure.  
174 CSRC Announcement No.12 [2009] Provisions on the Classified Supervision and 
Administration of Securities Companies (on May 26, 2009). 
175 According to Art 127 of the Securities Law 2014, a minimum registered capital of RMB50 
million is required of securities companies engaging in 1) securities brokerage business; (2) securities 
investment consulting; and (3) provision of financial advisory services relating to securities trading 
and securities investment activities. 
176 The Rule of National Equities Exchange Quotations Market Maker Business Management 2014 
(Trial) Article 6. 
177 Art 124 of the Securities Law 2014 stipulates that securities companies shall have net assets no 
less than 200 million RMB. 
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5. Quotation and Trading Rules   
The quotation and trading rules of the LEEs provide a form of experimentation that 
serves to delimit the respective roles of the New Third board and the LEEs as conduits for 
finance to SMEs. While the LEEs cannot compete directly with the national market in 
trading the securities of companies listed on the national market, the New Third Board was 
granted national market status in September 2015, thereby enabling it to trade securities 
listed on the national market. Thus, we observed in our field research that the LEEs and the 
New Third Board are in competition with each other. At the local level, experimentation in 
quotation and trading also serves the purpose of determining whether there is a role for 
LEEs by comparison with the more traditional sources of finance such as bank loans and 
family funding.      
 
Most companies quoted on the LEEs are joint stock companies. This is especially the 
case for those quoted on the LEEs of economically developed provinces. Indeed, the quoting 
standards of the ShangHai EE (SHEE) are almost similar to those of the New Third Board 
(NEEQ).  In addition to providing a one-off grand sum of fiscal subsidy to support the 
development of LEEs, QianHai EE (QHEE) in Shenzhen even provides such facilities as “low 
threshold, no prior approval, no registration and custody fees,” which in fact led to a surge of 
the number of companies quoted on the QHEE.178 Without such favourable standards for 
quotation, the LNEE and the DLEE can only quote a much lower number of companies. Even 
though both JSCs and LLCs are permitted to be quoted on the LNEE and the DLEE, they are 
quoted on different boards.179 Such treatment can be attributed to the difference in the 
                                                   
178 In comparison with typically hundreds of companies quoted on other LEEs, the QianHai 
Equity Exchange (QianHai EE) started with 1,200 firms making their debut in 2013. For more 
information, see 
<www.scmp.com/business/money/markets-investing/article/1250932/shenzhen-sme-share-market-
starts-1200-firms> accessed on 15 June  2015. After 2 years of operation, there are now 6163 
companies from 229 cities quoted in QianHai EE. For more information, see <www.qhee.com> 
(accessed on 15 June  2015). 
179 There are four boards in LNEE and two in DLEE. In LNEE, no specific capital requirements 
can be found in the board of financing transactions and the board of small and micro companies. The 
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potential conversion to the New Third Board or the Main Board as all companies to be 
quoted on the former or to be listed on the latter must be JSCs.180 
 
In general, the companies applying for quotation on the LNEE and the DLEE should 
have been operating for at least one year, with good reputation and business performance.181 
Both the LNEE and the DLEE request a clear shareholding structure and good corporate 
governance as well as compliance with laws and regulations for a year prior to application. Of 
course, the decision to apply for quotation on the LEEs should be approved by the general 
shareholder meeting or the board of the applicant company. Capital requirements can be 
found in the quoting requirements of the LNEE, but none in those of DLEE. Both the LNEE 
and DLEE separate the companies by their characteristics and put them into different 
boards. 
 
Table 5: Quotation Requirement on the LNEE and DLEE 
 LNEE DLEE 
Business place 
No restriction on the place of 
registration of candidate 
companies182 
Registered in Dalian 
Types of 
1. Unquoted JSC 
2. Limited liability company 
1. Unquoted JSC 
2. Limited liability company 
                                                                                                                                                              
capital requirements of the board of financing service for technology companies and the board of SMEs 
innovation are the same (see Table 4). The DLEE established two boards: one for unlisted companies 
limited shares and the other for limited liability companies. However, there do not appear to be any 
capital requirements. 
180 Only JSCs are qualified for listing and trading on stock exchanges: see Art 50 0f the Securities 
Law 2014.  
181 The Rule of Liaoning Equity Exchange Quoting Business (Trial) Article 10; The Rule of Dalian 
Equity Exchange Quoting Business (Trial) Article 7. 
182 According to the Provisional Rules on the Supervision and Administration of LEEs (Draft for 
Opinions) (2015) Article 4, cross-provinces listing is permitted on the condition that an agreement 
between the two provinces has been reached, . In our case, as LNEE has already been a shareholder of 
Inner-Mongolia EE, it is no surprise that the LNEE has such a regulation whereas the DLEE does not. 
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companies183 
3. No clear rules for partnership 
firm and others  
3. Partnership firm 
4. Other economic organization 
Period of operation ≥ 1 year ≥ 1 year 
File for Application Two types: Simple and Explicit  N/A 
Capital 
requirements 
Board for financing services 
(technology) and SMEs:184 
1. Operating profit ≥ 1 million 
RMB within 12 months, or  
2. Operating revenue ≥ 20 million 
RMB within 24 months, or  
3. Net asset ≥ 5 million RMB, and 
operating revenue ≥ 5 million 
RMB within 12 months, or 
4. Good loan records, or 
investment from financial 
organizations within 12 months 
No clear capital requirements 
can be found in any official 
documents 
Registration and 
Custody of Shares 
Register within 2 days after 
getting the abbreviation and code  
Before applying to be quoted 
Other 
requirements 
1. Clear shareholding structure 
2. Good corporate governance 
3. No serious violation of laws and regulations within 1 year 
4. The shareholders’ agreement on permitting the company to be 
quoted 
 
Even though the quotation standards in terms of operating profits, operating revenue 
and net assets are much lower than those on the national New Third Board, they are still 
                                                   
183 It should be noted that, in contrast with the bifurcation of private and public companies limited 
by shares in the EU, companies limited by shares in China are categorized into Limited Liability 
Company (LLC) and Joint-Stock Company (JSC) and that only the qualified JSC can be listed on the 
main board. “Unquoted” refers here to JSCs not being listed on the main board and not quoted on the 
New Third Board.   
184 This information cannot be found in the Quotation Rules but on the official websites. For the 
board for financing service (technology), see 
<http://www.lneec.com/center/channel_wygp.jhtml?fmode=1>; for the board for financing for SMEs, 
see <http://www.lneec.com/center/channel_wygp.jhtml?fmode=2> accessed 10 June 2015.  
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high thresholds for SMEs or micro-enterprises who seek equity financing on the LEEs.185 In 
addition, the concern of entrepreneurs over losing control may also frustrate them from 
seeking equity financing on the LEEs. An additional hurdle for the development of the equity 
financing function of the LEE may be the lack of commercial entrepreneurism in the 
North-eastern provinces among investors, entrepreneurs and government officials. Last but 
not least, the T+5 trading scheme also undercuts the liquidity of the market. On the SHSE 
and the SZSE, the T+1 (or T+3 for B shares) trading system enables shares bought on the 
transaction date to be sold out on the following day whereas payment received for shares 
sold on the transaction date can still be employed to buy further shares.186 In comparison, 
the T+5 trading system is the norm on LEEs, meaning that the investors can’t sell the equity 
within 5 days after share purchase from the same company or use the consideration to 
purchase new equity within 5 days after the sale of the shares. The T+5 operation mode on 
the LNEE and the DLEE187 may in effect be identified with a lock up period of 5 days as no 
transaction is possible during the 5 days of settlement. While that might not be an 
impediment for long-term investors, China’s stock markets are characterised by speculative 
and short-term trading and therefore this lockup period can be viewed as a barrier to the 
initial development of the LEEs as an alternative for investors.   
 
Efforts to facilitate the equity financing function of the LNEE have already been made. 
For instance, the LNFO coordinated with the LiaoNing Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (LNAIC), the SYAIC and the LNEE to enter into a cooperation agreement 
according to which the LNAIC will automatically accredit the registration of new share 
transferees once share transfers are completed on the LNEE. While that initiative may 
enhance liquidity, it is not clear that the sort of short-term trading that dominates the 
                                                   
185 Note in particular the requirements of profits, revenue and net assets.  
186 The settlement rules of both the Shanghai Company and the Shenzhen Company of The China 
Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (CSDC) adopt the T+1 trading system: see 
section 3 of the Settlement Rules of Shanghai and section 4 of Ch 1 of Settlement Rules of Shenzhen.  
187 The Rules of The LiaoNing Equity Exchange Trading Business 2014 (Trial) Article 16; The Rule 
of Dalian Equity Exchange Quoting and Trading Business 2014 (Trial) Article 17.  
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national exchanges is an appropriate model to meet the financing and governance 
requirements of SMEs traded on the LEEs since qualified investors may well envisage a more 
active role as a route towards generating value in contrast with the more passive role of 
shareholders in large companies listed on the national exchanges.  
 
Given the fierce competition from the New Third Board (NEEQ), LEEs are pressed, for 
the sake of their own sustainable development, to develop their debt financing function. This 
alternative mode of operation was clearly the intentional design of the CSRC and the SC.188  
It was much less clear, however, that the private contractual process in the debt market could 
redress the institutional gaps on the local equity market in the manner that has occurred. 
The process works through the lender taking advantage of its negotiating power to require 
the borrower to disclose information on corporate governance as required on the public 
equity market and then lending according to the governance practices of the debtor. The debt 
is then distributed to investors in securitised form through the LEE.189 Such arrangements 
indicate that market participants can use all the available possible means to achieve good 
governance practices which cannot be secured under the current regulatory framework of 
LEEs. The complementary role of private contracting is thus very apparent in terms of 
improving the governance practices not by way of legalized rules but rather through a private 
contractual process prior to the stage when the market is ready to have a set of sophisticated 
regulatory rules.190 In that sense experimentation at the local level indicates that good 
corporate governance is valued in the market by investors whether or not it is required by the 
LEE or other regulatory authorities.    
 
                                                   
188 As reflected in Circular No.37 by the SCGO and Circular No.38 by the CSRC. 
189 Interviewees indicated that this type of business formed the majority of the business of the 
LNEE.  
190 A similar trend had already been evident in Russia’s transition to capitalism: see Doreen 
McBarnet, ‘Transitional transactions: legal work, cross-border commerce and global regulation’ in 
Michael Likosky (ed) Transnational Legal Processes (London: Butterworths, 2002) discussing the use 
of contractual terms in public offers of shares in Russia in respect of the liability of the issuer for the 
accuracy of its share register.  
 58 
6. Qualified Investors 
The requirements for qualified investors are similar in the LNEE and DLEE. Both 
separate investors into institutional and individual investors, and design the requirements 
accordingly. In general, as shown in Table 5, the LNEE has relatively higher requirements for 
investors, indicating a preference for a higher degree of investor protection by limiting access 
to the relatively unproven enterprises likely to seek a quotation on the LEEs. Institutional 
investors should have at least 1 million RMB registered capital or the total actual capital 
contribution by partners should be no less than 1 million RMB if it is a partnership. A similar 
capital requirement for institutional investors can’t be found in DLEE. For the individual 
investors, the LNEE deems individual investors with total assets no less than 0.5 million 
RMB as qualified individual investors whereas the counterpart for the DLEE is lower than 
half of this figure, i.e., merely 0.2 million RMB in terms of total financial assets.  
 
Table 6: Qualified Investors on LNEE and DLEE 
 
Institution Individuals 
LNEE DLEE LNEE DLEE 
Type 
Qualified 
financial 
institutions 
Person with 
full capacity 
for civil 
conduct 
Qualified Legal 
institutions, 
partnership 
companies, 
financial 
institutions 
1. ≥ 18 years old 
2. Person with 
full capacity 
for civil 
conduct 
Capital 
requirements 
1. Register 
capital ≥ 1 
million RMB  
2. Total actual 
investment 
by partners 
≥ 1 million 
RMB 
 
Total financial 
asset ≥ 0.5 
million RMB 
Total financial 
asset ≥ 0.2 
million RMB 
Other   1. Understand 1. Understand 
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requirements  the risk of 
investment 
2. Pass the exam 
of equity 
investment 
and risk 
identification 
3. Enter into An 
Agreement of 
Risk 
Disclosure 
with the EE or 
the Agencies 
the risk of 
investment 
2. Pass certain 
exams 
3. Having 
experience in 
securities 
investment, 
and no bad 
records 
 
7. Explaining the Failure of the LEEs as a Conduit for SME 
Financing  
The main purpose in developing the LEEs is to encourage the growth of SMEs through 
expanding their financing options. Investigations through our project suggest that neither 
LiaoNing nor DaLian has been able to develop the equity funding function of the LEE 
successfully. The LNEE has developed trading mainly in bonds backed by trade debts 
whereas DLEE has largely been limited to "showcasing" quoted companies with almost no 
trading or capital raising having taken place. Both equity exchanges face the problem of 
"markets without investors". 
 
There are several explanations for this outcome. First, the equity financing function of 
the LEEs has intentionally been marginalized by the central regulator. The current 
promotion of the national New Third Board and the LEEs must be understood within a 
context where the two national stock exchanges have already been in existence for over two 
decades and the legitimacy of the national regulator (the CSRC) has already been established. 
With the well-established national stock exchanges and the currently feted national New 
Third Board, LEEs coveted by the local governments may have to fit their feet to the shoes 
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made by the central government. We can accordingly observe a guided evolution of the 
securities market in China with control from the central government on the sequence of 
development and the interaction of markets at different levels. The national markets are 
without doubt given priority. We thus experienced the super priority of the two national 
exchanges and then the national New Third Board. The campaign to promote the multi-tier 
capital market was accordingly not a random, unorganized evolution. The Chinese approach 
is very different from the challenge that the SEC saw itself facing in 1997 to promote 
competition among different trading systems so as to ‘‘develop a forward-looking and 
enduring approach that will permit diverse markets to evolve and compete while preserving 
market-wide transparency, fairness and integrity’.191  
 
Our project also shows that the dividing line between the administrative and judicial 
hierarchy is not clear. When no laws exists, for instance in our case of the LEEs in the late 
1990s, we see strong intervention from the administrative hierarchy. While Chinese 
Administrative Law and the Law on Legislature do stipulate that regulations cannot be in 
conflict with laws or regulations at higher levels, the possibility of a judicial review of local 
regulations when no law exists is still slight. It is accordingly unlikely that a judicial review of 
administrative policies by reference to deficiencies in cost-benefit analysis in rule-making is 
possible in China.192 In addition, even though the development of China’s securities market 
is still a government controlled but incrementally government induced process, the 
nonlinear feedback loop between the experimentation and the central policy making may 
still provide opportunities for “political lightning” that could “transform a long-dead policy 
proposal and push it to the top of the agenda.”193 
                                                   
191 SEC Concept Release, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,486 (1997). A similar focus on competition and market 
integrity was later evident in the EU’s approach to the emergence of alternative trading venues: see 
preamble 5 to MiFID (Directive 2004/39, [2004] OJ L 145/1).    
192 For a discussion of this issue in the context of the US courts striking down SEC regulation as a 
result of failures in cost-benefit analysis see Matthew Spitzer and Eric Talley, ‘On Experimentation and 
Real Options in Financial Regulation’ (2014) 43 Journal of Legal Studies 121, arguing that the benefits 
of field experimentation tend to be over-estimated by regulators and undervalued by the courts.    
193 Sebastian Heilmann, ‘Experimentation under Hierarchy’, supra n 61, at 17.  
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Such confusion over the appropriate roles for administrative and judicial authority 
leads to a situation in which there is no clear concept of a regulatory perimeter in China. 
Thus, the western understanding of an OTC market in which innovative financing, 
intermediation and execution techniques can be developed beyond the scope of regulatory 
oversight cannot be applied to China. The possibility of ex post regulatory intervention and 
the imperative of preserving good relations with provincial governments mean that 
innovation can only be approached in a cautious and incremental manner.   
 
Second, the lack of product variety is another reason for the lack of investors on the 
market. Products available on exchanges at higher levels are still not available to investors on 
the LEEs. Cross-quoting of or co-recognition for a quoted share on local exchanges is still 
restricted and competition between markets at different levels (regional/national) so as to 
achieve a competitive healthy national market system is still not possible at this time.194 In 
addition, bank-credit based products, gold, insurance and related products are also not 
available on LEEs, much less the trading of structured products or derivatives at this stage. 
All these contribute to the lack of variety of products permitted to be traded on the LEEs. 
While debt financing has enjoyed relatively greater success on the LNEE, it has also been 
constrained by the lack of an efficient credit rating system for both individuals and 
enterprises.  
 
Thus, introducing more products to the LEEs may help to alleviate the current 
moribund situation. New products such as a structured equity product based on an index for 
the region might well be considered as useful innovations for LEEs. Moreover, lobbying for 
mutual recognition across regional boundaries so as to permit cross-quoting into another 
province may also be useful at this stage. Passive investment products (indexation) might 
also be promoted by the LEEs for the purpose of increasing product variety.  
                                                   
194 See the Provisional Rules on the Supervision and Administration of LEEs (Draft for Opinions) 
Article 4 (2015) in general. 
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Third, the trading scheme of T+5 (with its purpose of providing safety to transaction 
parties) may undermine the liquidity of the market, thereby limiting its attraction relative to 
the National Market and the Third Market. In addition, the failure to introduce a 
market-maker system to the LEEs may also further undermine the liquidity of the market.  
 
Fourth, our interviewees indicated that the local culture and recent economic stagnation 
also contribute to the lack of investors on the market. The less developed private economy, 
the comparatively weaker initiatives of local governments to develop the private economy, 
and the lack of confidence of the investors in the local economy all contribute to the outcome 
of a market without investors. That outcome however largely reflects the institutional context, 
which deserves long term efforts and possibly favourable policies from the central 
government. Progress on that front is linked to the dynamic of the relationship between 
central and local governments and the struggle for comparative advantage between and even 
inside the provinces.195  
 
Both LNEE and DLEE can be characterised as thin markets with a low degree of 
liquidity, and a low level of efficiency in the pricing process and in turn it is hard for them to 
play their expected function of pricing of the shares traded on the centres. Without a 
favourable regulatory environment, the low trading volume and the inactive trading 
activities on the LEEs may in turn further exacerbate their moribund situation. This is 
because for candidate companies only marginal reputation can be reaped for being quoted 
and traded on LEEs and for intermediaries support may only be provided with a high risk.  
 
It is reasonable to project that this situation may however stimulate the development of 
                                                   
195 For instance, DaLian has been striving for the financial centre of the Northeast and DaLian 
took advantage of the ambiguous effect of the rules of the CSRC and the SCO to further enhance its 
existing financial status within the region. See further Lam Tao-Chiu, ‘Central-Provincial Relations 
amid Greater Centralization in China’ (2010) 24 China Information 339. 
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the private equity industry, which can inject new capital and contribute to more buyout 
transactions. It is likely that private equity firms may be more efficient investors in SMEs 
and can draw indirect investors into their funds. The transaction costs involved however will 
be high and the entrepreneurs will usually have to give up their control of the company to the 
PE firms. However, given that PE firms are systematically controlled by the CSRC, the role of 
PE firms in promoting the liquidity of LEEs should not be exaggerated since the same 
priorities that led to the demise of the LEEs can be expected to emerge in that process.  
 
The regulatory framework for LEEs may raise questions as to whether information 
disclosure on corporate governance is preferred by potential investors. Our interviews reveal 
that some credit enhancement companies have already required such information, indicating 
that information necessary for equity investors can in principle be made available on the 
market. However, moving towards a stronger disclosure regime for lower tier markets such 
as the LEEs is inevitably a finely-balanced process. For instance, stringent requirements of 
disclosure may engender good governance practices but at the same time may increase 
quotation costs and in turn handicap prospective applicant companies. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we evaluated the role of experimentation in the process by which China 
has established and expanded its securities market in recent years. We noted that several 
characteristics of the Chinese system meant that the process of experimentation should be 
regarded as sui generis. One overriding consideration is that the relative weakness of the rule 
of law in China provides a conducive environment for adopting discretionary and 
experimental administrative policies before law and regulations are enacted. Beyond that we 
noted that several elements of the political structure were influential: a form of de facto 
federalism which combines political centralization with economic regional decentralization; 
the capacity for a longer-term view to be adopted in a one-party state where short-term 
electoral concerns are absent; and the direct influence of the Communist Party on 
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policy-making, enterprise management and securities market regulation through the 
Nomenklatura system. A more direct influence at the level of securities market regulation is 
the absence of a formal concept of “regulatory perimeter” comparable to western systems of 
regulation. The effect is that all financial sector activity is undertaken on the understanding 
that the state has discretionary power to intervene and may even do so on a retrospective 
basis. 
  
All these factors have played a part in the most recent phase of development of the 
Chinese securities market in which efforts have been made to establish local (provincial level) 
equity exchanges (LEEs) so as to support entrepreneurship and SMEs. The legal status of the 
LEEs remains unclear even if it is now clear that it is for Local Financial Offices rather than 
the CRSC to regulate their establishment and operation. However, the CSRC retains a 
significant influence over the operation of the LEEs through its role in regulating securities 
firms. Regulation of issuing and trading on the LEEs makes it difficult for them to meet their 
objective of supporting SMEs. There is no scope for the LEEs to compete with the national 
market nor can companies listed on the LEEs easily convert to the New Third Board or The 
National Market.  
 
Case studies of the LNEE and DLEE show that the LEE initiative has largely failed as it 
survives only by quoting and trading non-equity products. Several factors may have 
contributed to this unfortunate outcome. First, the strong control of the central government 
and the CSRC is apparent in exploring the LEE initiatives. The intentional segmentation of 
the local securities market and constraints imposed on local governments in promoting local 
securities market show that the central government is still reserved in granting full 
discretion to local governments. The evolutionary path to achieve a healthy national 
securities market by promoting free competition among local securities markets has 
accordingly been disfavoured. Instead, a guided and closely monitored evolutionary path has 
been selected.  
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The promotion of the New Third Board has occurred in parallel with the development of 
the LEEs and a series of strict quotation rules have since been promulgated on the New 
Third Board with the intention of attracting investors. The LEEs may be doomed to fail in 
this competition between the local teams and the national team. Third, constrained by the 
limited sources in terms of professionals, technology and administrative control, the LEEs 
may have to strike a hard balance between attracting candidate companies and long term 
investors. The empirical evidence up to now shows that lenient quotation rules, in 
comparison with those of the New Third Board, do not attract long term investors and fail to 
improve the liquidity of the market. In turn, the price discovery function of the LEEs has 
been handicapped.   
 
Nevertheless, benefits can still be observed as a result of the experimentation process 
with LEEs. Despite the strong control of the centre, both LiaoNing and DaLian governments 
still enjoy some discretion in designing local rules, which leaves scope to develop rules 
according to the needs of local markets. Indeed, our case studies show clear indicators of 
market development of corporate governance, market-led development of quotation and 
conduct rules, and development of regulatory expertise in the LNFO as a counterbalance to 
CSRC orthodoxy.   
 
It is possible to conclude from the perspective of national experimentation that the 
LEEs are simply not required, or at least not in their current configuration. But we need to 
look beyond LiaoNing before we can reach that conclusion. And we need to take into account 
the revitalisation of the objective of a multi-tier capital market that has been articulated by 
the incoming Chairman of the CSRC, Liu Shiyu. 196 In that sense our conclusions are 
provisional at this stage.  
                                                   
196 See ‘China dismisses top market regulator’ Financial Times (London 20 February 2016)  
